

**Dino Falaschetti**  
**Associate Professor**

**Books and Chapters:**

Editor, POLITICAL ECONOMY (Routledge, forthcoming 2010) (with Norman Schofield).

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN LAW, POLITICS, AND BUSINESS (Springer, forthcoming 2009)

MONEY, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND GOVERNANCE (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) (with Michael Orlando).

*Constraining Rational Choice: Allocation Versus Efficiency and the Origin of Commitment Problems*, in Irwin Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan, eds., POLITICS FROM ANARCHY TO DEMOCRACY (Stanford Law and Politics, 2004) (with Gary Miller).

**Journal Articles:**

*Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance*, 28 REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCE LAW 553 (2009).

*Deficits Do Matter: They Can Improve Government Quality*, Hoover Digest (forthcoming).

*Rocking the Fed's Boat*, HOOVER DIGEST 2008, no. 4 (with Michael Orlando), available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/30645154.html>

*When Deficits Make Sense*, HOOVER DIGEST 2008, no. 3, available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/22732319.html>

*Does a Hospital's Profit Status Affect its Operational Scope?* 33 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 129 (2008).

*Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? Evidence on Consumer Monopsony in Telecommunications*, 4 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 1065 (2008).

*Aggregate Health Expenditures, National Income, and Institutions for Private Property*, 17 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 393 (2005).

*Cutting the Dividends Tax ... and Corporate Governance Too?*, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 3(2): 31-34 (2005) (with Michael Orlando).

*Optimization in the Production of Government Services: Lessons for the Regulation of Auditor Independence*, FINANCIËLE STUDIEVERENIGING ROTTERDAM (FSR) FORUM 6(2): 16-23 (2004) (with Michael Orlando).

*Credible Commitments and Investment: Does Opportunistic Ability or Incentive Matter?*, ECONOMIC INQUIRY 41(4) 660-674 (2003).

*Can Theoretically Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy*, JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 19(1): 83-105 (2003).

*Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or Evidence of Shirking?* JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 8(2): 159-178 (2002).

*Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve*, JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 18(2): 488-510 (2002).

*Constraining Leviathan: Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment in Constitutional Design*, JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 13(4): 389-411 (2001) (with Gary Miller).

### **Book Reviews:**

Book Review, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 10(3): 290-292 (2002) (reviewing Usha Haley, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS (2001)).

### **Other Publications:**

*When Deficits Make Sense*, HOOVER DIGEST 2008, No. 3 (online at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/22732319.html> )

Contributions, Michael J. Stahl, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT (Sage Publications, 2004) (with Steve Parsons).

DECISIONS, DECISIONS, DECISIONS: ESSAYS ON HOW INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS INFLUENCE COLLECTIVE CHOICES (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1999).