[*] J.D. MAY 1998, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW; B.A. ENGLISH, MAY 1994, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA. THE AUTHOR THANKS RON CHRISTALDI FOR HIS HELPFUL COMMENTS ON AN EARLY VERSION OF THIS PIECE AND PROFESSOR DONNA CHRISTIE FOR POSITIVE FEEDBACK ABOUT THE COMMENT'S CONTENTS. Return to text.

[1] DEBORAH SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE 7 (1985). This quote, attributed to early Antarctic explorer Captain James Cook, illustrates the generally pessimistic view of Antarctic's resource potential two centuries ago. Return to text.

[2] The Antarctic Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1960) (statement of Dr. Lawrence M. Gould, Chairman, Committee on Polar Research, National Academy of Sciences). Return to text.

[3] See, e.g., D. Michael Hinkley, Protecting American Interests in Antarctica: The Territorial Claims Dilemma, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 43, 43 (1990) ("The exploitation of the natural resources of Antarctica will soon become a reality."). Return to text.

[4] See Patrick T. Bergin, Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty Regime, and Legal and Geopolitical Implications of Natural Resource Exploration and Exploitation, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1988) (noting that many now believe the extraction of Antarctica's mineral resources will soon become economically feasible); Gregory J. Lohmeier, Comment, Keeping Cool Amidst the Ice: Addressing the Challenge of Antarctic Mineral Resources, 2 EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 141, 141 (1987). Return to text.

[5] Most of the burgeoning Antarctic resource interest centers on oil and natural gas. See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 148. Return to text.

[6] See Robert M. Andersen, Leading International Efforts to Improve Environmental Controls in Antarctica While Navigating National Politics, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 303 (1994) ("An ice sheet dominates all but approximately two percent of Antarctica's majestic, yet forbidding, five and a half million square miles."). Return to text.

[7] See STEPHEN J. PYNE, THE ICE: A JOURNEY TO ANTARCTICA 51 (1986).

In this sort of cold . . . if you drop a steel bar it is likely to shatter like glass, tin disintegrates into loose granules, mercury freezes into a solid metal, and if you haul up a fish through a hole in the ice within five seconds it is frozen so solid it has to be cut with a saw.

[8] Antarctica is the world's coldest continent and no daylight whatsoever penetrates the icy darkness during the austral winter. See Andersen, supra note 6, at 303 & n.3. Return to text.

[9] See PYNE, supra note 7, at 51. Interestingly, even a remote and hostile environment like Mars has seen a considerable increase in exploration efforts of late with NASA's on-going Pathfinder mission. Return to text.

[10] Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 222 (1991). Antarctic blizzards sometimes produce winds in excess of 200 miles per hour and temperatures in Antarctica can reach 127 degrees Fahrenheit below zero. See Allan Young, Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45 n.1 (1985). Return to text.

[11] See Bergin, supra note 4, at 6 & n.19. This landmass is comparable in size to that of the U.S. and Europe combined. See id. Return to text.

[12] See Joyner, supra note 10, at 220. Return to text.

[13] See Ice and Ice Formations, in 20 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 793, 797 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter BRITANNICA]. Return to text.

[14] The Southern Ocean makes up about 10% of the world's oceans and denotes the southern portions of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. See Jennifer Angelini & Andrew Mansfield, A Call For U.S. Ratification of the Protocol on Antarctic Environmental Protection, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 163, 168 n.20 (1994). Return to text.

[15] See Christopher C. Joyner & Ethel R. Theis, The United States and Antarctica: Rethinking the Interplay of Law and Interests, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65, 70 n.24 (1987). Return to text.

[16] See PYNE, supra note 7, at 11. The largest documented iceberg sighting was estimated to rise 460 feet above the water. See id. In 1965, an 87-mile-long iceberg was reported off Enderby Land, Antarctica, and in 1926, Norwegian whalers observed an iceberg 100 miles long. See Young, supra note 10, at 45 n.2. Return to text.

[17] See Stuart B. Kaye, Legal Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75, 76 (1995). Return to text.

[18] Antarctica has no native trees, reptiles, land birds, or mammals. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Southern Ocean and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165, 171 (1985). Antarctica's "largest true land animal is probably a millimetre-long, spider-like mite." Rachel Campbell-Johnston, Why We Must Keep Antarctica a True Wilderness, TIMES (London), Aug. 7, 1996, at 13. Plant life consists only of algae, fungi, lichens, and mosses. See Bergin, supra note 4, at 7. Return to text.

[19] The Antarctic seas are home to krill, penguins, seals, whales, and numerous species of seabirds. See Paul Lincoln Stoller, Comment, Protecting the White Continent: Is the Antarctic Protocol Mere Words or Real Action?, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 336 n.5 (1995). Return to text.

[20] See Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 14, at 175. Return to text.

[21] See id.; see also Ritchenya Shepherd, The United States' Actions in Antarctica: The Legality, Practicality, and Morality of Applying The National Environmental Policy Act, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 373, 400 (1991). The United States' Antarctica operations are run primarily by the National Science Foundation, which operates three year-round research stations: McMurdo Station on Ross Island, Palmer Station on Anvers Island on the Antarctic Peninsula, and Amundson-Scott Station at the South Pole. See Andersen, supra note 6, at 303-04. Return to text.

[22] Over thirty research stations are present on Antarctica from at least 12 nations. See Bergin, supra note 4, at 9 & n.42. Return to text.

[23] For a thorough historical discussion of international environmental law, see ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991). Return to text.

[24] These agreements include the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL]. Thirty-six of the Antarctic Treaty parties signed MARPOL. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Antarctic Treaty System and the Law of the Sea—Competing Regimes in the Southern Ocean?, 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 301, 312 n.59 (1995). The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Dumping Convention), Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120. Return to text.

[25] Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Return to text.

[26] Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102-22, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1460 (not yet in force) [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol was finalized as the final act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting. Return to text.

[27] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Return to text.

[28] See Barbara Mitchell, Resources in Antarctica: Potential for Conflict, 1977 MARINE POL'Y 91, 94 (1977). Claims were made by the U.K. in 1908; New Zealand in 1923; France in 1924; Australia in 1933; Norway in 1939; Chile in 1940; and Argentina in 1942. See Elizabeth K. Hook, Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 489-90 (1978). Return to text.

[29] See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 94. Return to text.

[30] These countries are: Belgium, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and the United States. See id. Return to text.

[31] The original twelve Antarctic Treaty members are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. As of 1992, there were 40 members of the Antarctic Treaty System, but only the 26 members possessing full voting rights are bound by the Antarctic Treaty. See William M. Welch, The Antarctic Treaty System: Is it Adequate to Regulate or Eliminate the Environmental Exploitation of the Globe's Last Wilderness?, 14 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 597, 619 n.118 (1992). The 26 Consultative Parties include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. See id. Return to text.

[32] See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 141. Return to text.

[33] See Robert M. Andersen & Lawrence Rudolph, On Solid International Ground in Antarctica: A U.S. Strategy for Regulating Environmental Impact on the Continent, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 93 (1989), for an extensive discussion of the current legal framework governing environmental issues in Antarctica. Return to text.

[34] The Protocol defines the Consultative Parties as "the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of that Treaty." Protocol, supra note 26, at 1462. Return to text.

[35] See Welch, supra note 31, at 620. Return to text.

[36] See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 25, at section IV. Return to text.

[37] See id. at Preamble. Return to text.

[38] See Bernard H. Oxman, Antarctica and the New Law of the Sea, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211, 224 (1986). The sovereignty issue thus exists in a "political vacuum." Kaye, supra note 17, at 76. Return to text.

[39] See Andersen, supra note 6, at 305. Return to text.

[40] See Sudhir Chopra et al., The Antarctic Minerals Agreement, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 204, 218 (1989). Return to text.

[41] The Consultative Parties that signed the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. See Protocol, supra note 26, at 1455. The contracting parties that signed are: Austria, Canada, Colombia, Greece, Hungary, South Korea, Romania, and Switzerland. See id. A nation that desires to become a Consultative Party must demonstrate "its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial research activity there" as accepted by other Consultative Parties. See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 145. Return to text.

[42] See Protocol, supra note 26, art. 7 ("Any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited."). Fifty years after the Protocol enters into force, the mineral prohibition can be lifted if three-fourths of the current Antarctic Treaty Consulta tive Parties vote to do so at a Review Conference and subsequently ratify it. See Protocol, supra note 26, art. 25, para. 4; see also Christopher C. Joyner, Fragile Ecosystems: Preclusive Restoration in the Antarctic, 34 Nat. Resources J. 879, 893-94 (1994). Return to text.

[43] See Protocol, supra note 26, art. 25, para. 5.b. Return to text.

[44] For a discussion about the potential ill-effects of the walk-out provision, see infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[45] See D'Vora Ben Shaul, Harsh Treatment of a Frozen and Fragile Land, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 27, 1997, at Features 7. Return to text.

[46] As of May 1997, 26 countries had signed the Protocol, and all but Japan had ratified it. See Russian Parliament Ratifies Antarctic Environmental Accord, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 26, 1997. All 26 nations that are party to the Antarctic Treaty must ratify the Protocol for it to enter into effect. See Antarctic: Clinton Signs Bill Implementing Enviro Accord, AM. POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE, October 3, 1996. Article 23 provides that the Protocol will enter into force on the 30th day following the date the instruments of ratification are deposited by all Consultative Parties. See Protocol, supra note 26, art. 23, at 1469. The Consultative Parties that had ratified the Protocol as of October 1996 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. See Antarctic, supra. Return to text.

[47] See Jeff Rubin, Saving the Ice, 99 AUDUBON 1 (Jan. 1997). Return to text.

[48] See id. Return to text.

[49] See Joyner, supra note 24, at 302. Return to text.

[50] See UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 3. Territorial seas may not exceed twelve nautical miles. See id. Return to text.

[51] See id., art. 33, para. 2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles. See id. Return to text.

[52] See id., art. 76, para. 5. The continental shelf may not exceed 350 nautical miles or 100 miles from the 2500 meter isobath. See id. Return to text.

[53] See id., art. 57. EEZs may not exceed 200 nautical miles. See id. Return to text.

[54] See id., art. 136. Return to text.

[55] See id., art. 1, para. 1.(1). Return to text.

[56] See id., art. 136. Return to text.

[57] Territorial sea is an extension of the sovereignty of a coastal state. See id., art. 2, at 1272. EEZs and the continental shelf are extensions of the territorial sea. See id., art. 55, at 1280, & art. 76, at 1285. Thus, none of these three can exist without a recognized claim of sovereignty on the continent. Although the continental shelf exists ab initio, meaning states have an inherent right to it under international law, that right cannot exist unless there is a recognized coastal state to assert it. See DONNA R. CHRISTIE, COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 318-19 (1994). Return to text.

[58] See James E. Carroll, Of Icebergs, Oil Wells, and Treaties: Hydrocarbon Exploitation Offshore Antarctica, 19 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 207, 219 (1983). Return to text.

[59] See Oxman, supra note 38, at 238. Return to text.

[60] See infra notes 150-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible remedies to the sovereignty problem Return to text.

[61] For a discussion about the potential dangers an all-out land rush could produce, see infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[62] OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, POLAR PROSPECTS: A MINERALS TREATY FOR ANTARCTICA 3 (1989) [hereinafter POLAR PROSPECTS]. Return to text.

[63] See id. Return to text.

[64] See Joyner, supra note 10, at 220. Return to text.

[65] Geologists surmise that because Antarctica was once part of the ancient super-continent, Gondwanaland, oil found on other former areas of Gondwanaland evidences the presence of oil in Antarctica. See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 147-48. Return to text.

[66] See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 128 (1988). "Geologic studies indicate sizable [hydrocarbon] potential in the immediate offshore area [of Antarctica]." Lisa Sostack, Halbouty Likes Antarctic Oil Potential, THE OIL DAILY, May 8, 1986, at 8 (quoting Michael T. Halbouty, an independent oilman). In 1973, pockets of natural gas were discovered beneath the Ross Sea, causing the U.S. Geological Survey "to speculate that 115 trillion cubic feet of the resource may be recoverable" from Antarctica's continental shelf. Bergin, supra note 4, at 24. Return to text.

[67] In 1974, Russia's Institute for Arctic Geology estimated that Antarctic oil deposits surpass Alaska's. See Bergin, supra note 4, at 24 n.130. Return to text.

[68] See Carroll, supra note 58, at 212 n.33; see also EMILIO J. SAHURIE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANTARCTICA 355-57 (1992). Return to text.

[69] See JEAN- YVES LE DéAUT, THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (Joe Verhoeven et al. eds., 1992). Return to text.

[70] See id. Return to text.

[71] See David H. Elliot, Antarctia: Is There Any Oil and Natural Gas?, Oceanus, Summer 1988, at 37. See generally MAARTEN J. DE WIT, MINERALS AND MINING IN ANTARCTICA: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS (1985). Return to text.

[72] See Elliott, supra note 71, at 37. The enormous size of such oil deposits is underscored by noting that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) reserves are estimated to be around 440 billion barrels. See David L. Larson, United States Interests in the Arctic Region, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 167, 169 (1989). Return to text.

[73] Hydrocarbons are generated from marine and terrestrial organic debris, which is broken down into oil and gas by a combination of temperature and time. See Elliot, supra note 71, at 33. Return to text.

[74] See id. at 32. Return to text.

[75] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 355 n.28. Return to text.

[76] See PYNE, supra note 7, at 353. Ten of 21 Antarctic oil basins were considered viable exploration targets in 1985. See Alan Kovski, Antarctica: A Continent is Placed Off Limits to Oil Exploration, THE OIL DAILY, Oct. 8, 1991, at 2. It should be pointed out that two arguments commonly used to dissuade interest in Antarctic oil exploration as a profitable enterprise may not have a strong basis in fact. Higher transportation and labor costs are frequently cited as reasons why extracting Antarctic oil is prohibitively expensive. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 432-33. However, both of these reasons have been criticized. With respect to transportation costs, Antarctica is farther away from Europe than the Middle East, it is closer to Japan than the Middle East and not unreasonably far from the United States. Furthermore, volatile oil producing regions, like the Middle East, impute high insurance rates, which increase transportation costs due to the dangers of shipping oil through such politically unstable areas. See id. at 432. In addition, labor costs would likely be lower than in the Arctic or North Sea if workers are taken from the nearby low-income countries of the Southern Hemisphere. See id. at 433. Return to text.

[77] Supergiant oil fields contain 30-100 billion tons of oil. See PYNE, supra note 7, at 354; see also POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 20 (defining a supergiant oil field as one containing in excess of five billion barrels of oil). Return to text.

[78] See PYNE, supra note 7, at 353-54. Return to text.

[79] See id. at 354. Return to text.

[80] See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[81] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 355. See id. at 486 n.8 for an extensive list of oil prospects in Antarctica Return to text.

[82] See Andrew N. Davis, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard the Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733, 740 (1990). Return to text.

[83] See id. at 759-60 n.199. Return to text.

[84] As one oil company geologist stated: "If the weather was our only obstacle, we'd probably all be down there bumping into one another." Sharon Denny, The Hunt for Offshore Oil Moves into Deeper Waters, THE OIL DAILY, May 6, 1985, at B2. Return to text.

[85] See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 19-21. Return to text.

[86] See id. at 20. Although similar to Arctic drilling in some respects, Antarctic drilling presents different obstacles to overcome because Antarctica, as a frozen continent surrounded by oceans, is generally subject to more severe weather conditions than the Arctic, which is essentially a frozen ocean surrounded by continents. See Kaye, supra note 17, at 76. Return to text.

[87] For example, due to the high concentration of icebergs in the Southern Ocean, improved technology is necessary to allow drilling platforms to be moved out of harm's way and for well caps on the sea floor to be protected from icebergs scouring the surface of the continental shelf. See id. Technology is not yet available to penetrate the glacial ice covering onshore areas. See Kovski, supra note 76, at 2. To extract oil from Antarctica would require combining technologies developed for ice-covered areas and deep water. See Nick Snow, OTA Projects Antarctic Development, THE OIL DAILY, Sept. 29, 1989, at 4. Drifting icebergs as big as Massachusetts could crush drilling rigs like beer cans and rip up subsea pipelines. See id. Temperatures a hundred degrees below zero, coupled with hurricane force winds, would break iron "like glass when you hit it with a hammer," says David Kingston, an Exxon Corporation geologist who has studied the problem. Id. These conditions notwithstanding, the oil companies are convinced they can conquer any cold-weather difficulties. See id. Return to text.

[88] See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 21. Current world crude oil production is about 21 billion barrels annually and has remained stable at that amount in recent years. As of January 1995, estimates place proven world reserves at between 999 and 1,111 billion barrels. See THE WORLD ALMANAC 1997, 238 (Robert Famighetti, ed.) (1996) [hereinafter ALMANAC]. Return to text.

[89] Profitability and risk, not weather or frigid temperatures, will ultimately determine whether a company has the incentive to develop an Antarctic oil field. See Snow, supra note 87, at 4. Oil was priced at $2 per barrel in 1970, but jumped to $12 in 1973 due to the 1973 oil embargo by OPEC, before stabilizing at around $30. See S.F. Singer, World Demand for Oil, in THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH 339, 346 (J. Simon & H. Kahn eds., 1984). Because of a worldwide surplus of oil and lower oil demand, prices dropped to such an extent that developed countries were discouraged from pursuing alternative fuel sources to meet their energy needs. Today, the worldwide addiction to oil continues. See generally Lee A. Daniels, OPEC's Pricing Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1985, at D1. Return to text.

[90] See William H. Lang Jr. et al., Oil Crunch Going to Hurt, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 8, 1997, at A21. Return to text.

[91] See Denny, supra note 84. Indeed, oil companies continue to venture into ever more remote areas in their quest to locate new oil fields. See Robert Corzine, Oil Exploration, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at 15. Return to text.

[92] See Christopher C. Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 73, 88 n.1 (1988). The basic exploration phase would take 3-5 years with another 9-15 years required for drilling and development. See id. Thus, 15-20 years would be needed from the start of exploration until start of production. See Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal, and Political Issues 180 (1983). Research ships and aircraft would conduct geological mapping and analysis; drilling of exploratory holes would follow with commercial quantities of oil found on land in about 1 in 50 holes. See Carroll, supra note 58, at 210-11. Another challenge will be storage facilities since regular shipping will be difficult due to the harsh Antarctic environment. See id. In addition, because of the build-up of ice during the long Antarctic winter, the entire production facility would have to be below the surface and able to function nine months of the year without surface maintenance. See Colin Deihl, Antarctica: An International Laboratory, 18 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 423, 430 (1991). Return to text.

[93] See Joyner, supra note 92. Return to text.

[94] See Michael Crabbe, Antarctica: Oil Potential for Next Century, 52 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 365, 365 (1985). Return to text.

[95] See Leigh Derenne Braslow, Comment, Coastal Petroleum's Fight to Drill Off Florida's Gulf Coast, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343, 346 (1997). Return to text.

[96] Ice-reinforced tankers, submersible drilling rigs, and underwater storage facilities are some examples of recent technologies developed to overcome the inherent problems of offshore oil exploration in ice-covered areas. See Joyner, supra note 92, at 87. These modern technologies can impact costs. For example, icebreakers needed to keep channels open ten months out of the year cause shipping costs in Antarctica to rise to as much as ten times the United States level. See M.J. Peterson, Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth, 34 INT'L ORG. 377, 388 (1980). Return to text.

[97] See Corzine, supra note 91, at 15 (noting that technology has progressed to the point where oil fields in more than 5,000 feet of water are now in production and drilling in depths of 10,000 feet is not far off). Return to text.

[98] See Deihl, supra note 92, at 429. Oil companies that have expressed interest in Antarctica include British Petroleum, Elf, Hunt Oil, Texas Gulf, and Total. See DE WIT, supra note 71, at 5. Return to text.

[99] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 74; see also Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 141-42. Oil companies may even join forces for such an undertaking. For example, in January 1995, Shell Oil, Amoco, and Exxon collaborated to develop the deepest offshore oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico capable of extracting 60,000 barrels of oil every day. See Amy deGeneres Berret, UNCLOS III: Pollution Control in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 55 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1995). "Ten years from now production from 1,000 feet will be considered common and shallow . . . . In the past five years, more new [oil technologies] have been introduced than in the previous 50 . . . [and] every three years the technology has become obsolete." Sostack, supra note 66, at 8. Return to text.

[100] From the beginning of humanity to 1945, it took 10,000 generations to reach a world population of 2 billion. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 30-33 (1992). In the span of just one generation, it will increase from 2 to 9 billion. From 5.5 billion in 1992, the world will be subjected to a population explosion reaching 9 billion by 2032. See id. This "Lemming syndrome" indicates that demands for oil will undergo a corresponding increase. See Chopra et al., supra note 40, at 216 (remarks by Robert Hayton). Return to text.

[101] Bryan Burrough, Polar Predicament: If Antarctic Oil Search Is a Success, Pollution, Discord May Follow, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1985 at 1. The potential for Antarctic oil activity is bolstered by the fact that Arctic oil, produced under similarly harsh environmental conditions, has become a major oil source. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 74. Return to text.

[102] See Alexei Yu. Roginko & Matthew J. LaMourie, Emerging Marine Environmental Protection Strategies for the Arctic, 16 MARINE POL'Y 259, 264 n.34 (1992). World production of petroleum in 1994 was about 66.7 million barrels per day, or 139 quadrillion Btu, and petroleum remained the world's most heavily used source of energy. See ALMANAC, supra note 88, at 236. Return to text.

[103] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 74 (suggesting that the importance of Antarctic oil is more political than economic since it could alleviate the dependence of many industrialized nations on the will of a few producers, such as OPEC). Almost 100 percent of Japan's oil needs are imported. See id. at 97 n.543. Chile, one of original parties to the Antarctic Treaty, imports 60 percent of its oil. See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 97. Even some countries rich in resources, such as the United States, traditionally have preferred to bring raw materials from abroad. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 97. Return to text.

[104] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 97. Return to text.

[105] See id. The low oil prices of 1994, while benefiting consumer countries in the short term, weakened profitability for producers, which may lead to reduced oil supplies and higher prices in the medium and long term. See Gerald Karey, IAEE Conference Begins in Norway, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, May 27, 1994, at 4. Return to text.

[106] Due to price drops in the 1980s, domestic U.S. oil production shrank from 4000 working rigs in 1981 to less than 2000 at the end of 1985. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 157-58. This reduction in domestic production raised U.S. importation of oil to 30 percent by the mid-1980s with projections of 50 percent for the 1990s. See id. Oil and petroleum products make up one of the largest U.S. imports. See CIA OFFICE OF PUBLIC AND AGENCY INFORMATION, WORLD FACT BOOK 1995, 444 (1996). Return to text.

[107] See Karey, supra note 105, at 4. Return to text.

[108] Id. Return to text.

[109] See id. Return to text.

[110] See generally Bernard P. Herber, Mining or World Park? A Politico-Economic Analysis of Alternative Land Use Regimes in Antarctica, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 839, 847-48 (1991). Return to text.

[111] As discussed previously, several conditions would need to occur to spur Antarctic oil exploration efforts: (1) technology capable of making Antarctic oil exploitation feasible would have to exist; (2) stability of claims would be a prerequisite before any oil exploration would begin; (3) heavy oil importing countries such as Japan, the United States, Germany, and France would need to have interior calls for securing a steady and dependable supply of oil; and (4) oil prices would have to rise. The occurrence of all of these conditions is not at all unreasonable to project. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 158. Return to text.

[112] See R. Tucker Scully & Lee A. Kimball, Antarctica: Is There Life After Minerals? The Minerals Treaty and Beyond, 13 MARINE POL'Y 87, 88 (1989). It is not difficult to imagine nations calling for a special diplomatic summit in order to negotiate out of the minerals ban when economic exploitation of the area's oil and mineral resources becomes feasible. Return to text.

[113] The United Kingdom has stated that "[i]f the economic pressures come on and if the demand was there . . . you would have a free-for-all in Antarctica which would destroy the environment for ever." Andrew F. Neuman, Closing the Frozen Treasure Chest: Antarctica's New Environmental Protocol, 3 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 57, 68 (1991). Return to text.

[114] See Joyner, supra note 24, at 330. Return to text.

[115] See id. Return to text.

[116] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 43-45 (noting suggestions that the United States should assert a territorial claim in Antarctica). Return to text.

[117] The United States refused to sign the Protocol unless an escape clause (Article 25) was included. See Welch, supra note 31, at 643-44. Return to text.

[118] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 44 n.6 (noting that the United States' interests in the Antarctic region include facilitating an increase in the global supply of mineral resources by defining rights to Antarctic mineral resources and ensuring access for the United States to all areas of Antarctica in which mineral resource activities may be determined acceptable). Return to text.

[119] U.S. Raises Objections to Antarctica Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1991, at C6 (quoting Curtis Bohlen, Chief United States Delegate). Return to text.

[120] The U.S. uses 40 percent of the world's production of petroleum. See David L. Bowler, Policy to Control Greed, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 8, 1997. The U.S. imported 15.74 quadrillion Btus of crude oil in 1995, representing the 5th consecutive year of growth in U.S. oil consumption. See ALMANAC, supra note 88, at 235. Return to text.

[121] In 1996, 46.2 percent of the oil used in the United States was imported and imports could account for up to 71 percent of U.S. oil supplies by 2015. See Reliance on Oil Imports Rankles Alaska Senator Richard Powelson Scripps Howard, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 29, 1997, at 18A. Return to text.

[122] See Welch, supra note 31, at 647. Significantly, the U.S. refrained from ratifying the minerals ban until October 1996, five years after the Consultative Parties adopted it. See Antarctic: Clinton, supra note 46. Japan had not ratified it as of June 1997. See Antarctica: Japan Delays Treaty Ratification, AM. POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE, May 20, 1997. Return to text.

[123] See Welch, supra note 31, at 649. If a large oil field is found in Antarctica that could be profitably developed, chances are good that "someone will wish to do so." Snow, supra note 87, at 4; see also Deihl, supra note 92, at 447-48 (noting that while potential political fallout could deter some states from pursuing Antarctic oil exploration, that may be outweighed by a state's oil needs). Return to text.

[124] See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Lessons from the Procedural Politics of the "Comprehensive" National Energy Policy Act of 1992, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 195 (1995) (noting that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War that followed ignited fears of rocketing oil prices and fueled the effort for a new national energy policy in the United States); see also Deihl, supra note 92, at 447; Davis, supra note 82, at 740 n.45 (stating that "the political instability of several oil producing countries is contributing to the wide fluctuations in oil supplies," which has raised Antarctica's stock as a potentially stable source of energy). Return to text.

[125] "As the nations of the world increasingly exhaust their available resources, it is inevitable that interest in remote regions of the planet will grow." Frants Dalgaard-Knudsen, The Greenlandic Offshore Area, 5 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 63, 70 (1992). Return to text.

[126] See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 161. Return to text.

[127] Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits claims of sovereignty. See Antartic Treaty, supra note 25. Return to text.

[128] See Chopra et al., supra note 40, at 218 (remarks by Christopher C. Joyner). Return to text.

[129] See Gerard J. Mangone, Defining the Indefinable: Antarctic Maritime Boundaries, in MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND OCEAN RESOURCES 227, 240 (Gerald Blake, ed., 1987). It should also be noted here that the U.S., Russia, and Japan were the last three Consultative Parties to ratify the Protocol, indicative of their interest in future Antarctic oil exploitation. See Russian Parliament Ratifies Antarctic Environmental Accord, supra note 46. Return to text.

[130] See Mangone, supra note 129, at 240. Return to text.

[131] "[I]t would be quite unrealistic to entertain the belief that sovereignty will be abandoned either in form or in substance." See Bergin, supra note 4, at 9 (citing ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 218 (O. Vicuna ed. 1983)). Return to text.

[132] Sovereign ownership encourages individual environmental responsibility. A good example of this involves the situation in a typical neighborhood where everyone living in the neighborhood owns his own yard. Most yard owners will naturally be inclined to keep their individual yards well kept by mowing when necessary and watering the lawn when needed. Of course, there may be a minority of owners who are not concerned about the upkeep of their yards. However, when the appearance of those yards becomes too unsightly, the majority of yard-owners can usually exert enough pressure to prompt the non-mower or non-waterer into remedying the situation. Conversely, if all the yards were simply combined into one giant yard which no one person owned, the attention and concern the collective neighbors would show towards the yard would be drastically reduced since each individual neighbor would tend to blame any problems of the yard's appearance on another neighbor or forego upkeep in the belief that even if they do their share of work, the other neighbors will not. Sovereign ownership of Antarctic "yards" would have a similar affect.

The nations most likely to acquire territory in Antarctica consist primarily of industrialized nations. These nations would be more likely to conserve their individually owned areas so as to maximize future sustainability. Those nations in the minority, uncaring about sustainability of their own accord, could similarly be prompted into proper environmentally protective measures by reliable enforcement of environmental regulations by all Antarctic Treaty System nations. Individual ownership in Antarctica, tempered by actively enforced environmental protection requirements, equates to a realistic governing regime for the Antarctic region which will effectively balance environmental concerns with economic demands. Return to text.

[133] Deihl, supra note 92, at 454-55 Return to text.

[134] See Catherine Redgwell, Current Developments—Public Internaitonal Law: Antarctica, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 976, 981 (1991) ("The environmental Protocol does not address the sovereignty issue, merely stating in Article 4 that the Protocol neither modifies nor amends the Antarctic Treaty."). Return to text.

[135] A dramatic analogy to the Antarctic Treaty signatories' avoidance of the problem of sovereignty claims in hopes that they will never have to deal with them is the world's treatment of Germany in the years preceeding World War II. Rather than confronting Hitler's Germany after its intitial territorial aggressions, the Allies fooled themselves into thinking that Hitler would be satisfied with those early acquisitions and the problem would dissipate of its own accord. The Allies' purposeful avoidance of the problem embodied by Hitler's Germany ultimately created a far greater problem culminating in the Second World War. Purposely diverting attention from the sovereignty problem in Antarctica may breed similar dangers to the Antarctic Treaty System nations in the near future, as armed conflict could easily erupt in a scramble to secure oil resources in the region. After all, only a few years ago the U.S. sent hundreds of thousands of military troops to the Persian Gulf to ensure a secure supply of Middle East oil. See Douglas S. Sandhaus, Should Congress Open Up the Alaskan Coastal Plain to Oil Exploration? A Discussion of Options, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 43, 48 (1992) (discussing the debate about "whether the economics of foreign oil were worth sacrificing the blood of American soldiers"). Return to text.

[136] Article 11 of the Protocol provides for a Committee for Environmental Protection, which could exercise its powers to provide guidance on the need for additional Annexes or amendments to the Protocol. See Protocol, supra note 26, art. 11, 12. Article 25 provides that the Protocol "may be modified or amended at any time." Protocol, supra note 26, art. 25. Return to text.

[137] Chistopher C. Joyner, Japan and the Antarctic Treaty System, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 155, 169 n.64 (1992) (quoting Mr. Kuroda, Japanese delegate to the U. N. General Assembly). Return to text.

[138] See generally D.R. Rothwell, The Madrid Protocol and Its Relationship with the Antarctic Treaty System, in ANTARCTIC AND SOUTHERN OCEAN LAW AND POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 25 (1992). Return to text.

[139] See Welch, supra note 31, at 643-44; see also, Protocol, supra note 26, art. 25, para. 5(b). The walkout clause states

If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force within 3 years of the date of its adoption, any Party may at any time thereafter notify to the Depository of its withdrawal from this Protocol, and such withdrawal shall take effect 2 years after receipt of the notification by the Depository.

[140] See Welch, supra note 31, at 647. Return to text.

[141] Id. at 651. Return to text.

[142] Id. Return to text.

[143] See Neuman, supra note 113, at 78. Return to text.

[144] See Welch, supra note 31, at 655. Return to text.

[145] See id. A similar loophole allows tour companies to register their vessels in non-Antarctic Treaty nations to avoid compliance with environmental protection requirements im posed under the Antarctic Treaty. See Shaul, supra note 45, at 7; see also Hinkley, supra note 3, at 43 (pointing out that "since nonparties are not bound by the 'freeze' provisions of article IV, any nonparty could stake its claim to Antarctica as soon as it could get there"). Return to text.

[146] See John J. Borceló III, The International Legal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155, 158 (1986). Return to text.

[147] See generally Deihl, supra note 92, at 448-49 (pointing out that some ships allegedly conducting scientific research are actually looking for oil). Return to text.

[148] See Stoller, supra note 19, at 362. Return to text.

[149] See id.; see also Christopher C. Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259, 269-70 (1986). Return to text.

[150] See Joyner, supra note 149, at 268-69; Stoller, supra note 19, at 362. Return to text.

[151] See id. Return to text.

[152] See Paul Brown, Ship on Mission to Clean Up Polar Waste, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 1997, at 4 (noting that the 26 nations operating in Antarctica have failed to honor the Madrid Protocol, a 1991 agreement to remove waste from the continent). Return to text.

[153] See Neuman, supra note 113, at 68. Return to text.

[154] See generally Donald R. Rothwell & Stuart Kaye, Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions: Reconsidering the Traditional Norms, 18 MARINE POL'Y 41, 58 (1994). Return to text.

[155] See Chopra, supra note 40, at 209. Return to text.

[156] See S.K.N. Blay, New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The 1991 Madrid Protocol, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 399 (1992). Return to text.

[157] Perhaps CRAMRA could be revived and altered to meet the needs of the Antarctic Treaty System parties. See Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (not in force) [hereinafter CRAMRA]. As one commentator has noted, "[i]ncorporating the CRAMRA approach, or a similar accomodation, into the Protocol is necessary to achieve a comprehensive and effective regime of Antarctic environmental protection." Francicso Orrego Vicuna, The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Questions of Effectiveness, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994). The U.K. stated that CRAMRA "incorporates some of the strictest environmental protection provisions known in international law." Redgwell, supra note 134, at 977 (quoting H.C. Deb., Vol. 171, col. 693 (May 4, 1990), per the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs). Return to text.

[158] Jus cogens, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, prohibits a treaty from becoming valid if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law. See Francesco Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163, 174 n.42 (1986). Return to text.

[159] See Mary Lynn Canmann, Antarctic Oil Spills of 1989: A Review of the Application of the Antarctic Treaty and the New Law of the Sea to the Antarctic Environment, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 211, 219-20 (1990). Return to text.

[160] See S.K.N. Blay et al., Antarctica After 1991: The Legal and Policy Options, in ANTARCTIC AND SOUTHERN OCEAN LAW AND POLICY 10 (1989). This is partly because the continental shelf doctrine was already established under customary international law when the Antarctic Treaty was signed. See VICUNA, supra note 66, at 127. Designation of a continental shelf is very important because oil and gas are the principal non-living resources found there. See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 301 (2d ed., 1994). Return to text.

[161] See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 442. Return to text.

[162] See Joyner, supra note 24, at 305. Return to text.

[163] See Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1537-38 (1991). Return to text.

[164] See Joyner, supra note 24, at 311. Return to text.

[165] A condominium consists of the joint exercise of sovereignty over a particular territory by two or more states. See Peterson, supra note 96, at 395. Return to text.

[166] See Oxman, supra note 38, at 223. This would keep Antarctica under the control of countries with experience in managing the area. See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 166. Return to text.

[167] See Oxman, supra note 38, at 222. Return to text.

[168] See Joyner, supra note 15 or 92, at 125. Return to text.

[169] See id. Return to text.

[170] See Peterson, supra note 96, at 396 (noting that the U.S. proposed an Antarctic condominium in 1948, which was rejected). Return to text.

[171] A consortium is similar to a condominium in that states would jointly regulate Antarctica. However, a significant difference would be that all territorial claims would merge. See id. Return to text.

[172] See id. Return to text.

[173] Common heritage of humankind derives from the law of the sea regime for governing deep sea-bed mining, which calls for all exploitation to be carried out for the benefit of the world as a whole. See UNCLOS, supra note 27, at Preamble. Return to text.

[174] OPEC's primary objective is to control oil prices and supply. See SAHURIE, supra note 68, at 74. Thus, it would surely disfavor a pro-production regime in Antarctica. Past efforts of OPEC to use oil supply control for political and economic leverage is what prompted states to seek secure supply sources in the first place. See id. OPEC's share of the world oil market will exceed 50 percent by the year 2010. See U.S. Geological Survey Team Gives Undiscovered Reserves Outlook, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 23, 1991, at 2. Return to text.

[175] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 52-53 (noting that the world park theory has never been acceptable to the Consultative Parties). Return to text.

[176] See Davis, supra note 82, at 735. Return to text.

[177] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 53. Return to text.

[178] Argentina has sent families to live year-round on its research bases, including expectant mothers to give birth on the Antarctic continent. See Peterson, supra note 96, at 392. Other claimant states have stationed postmasters on Antarctica for the sole purpose of establishing sovereignty. See id. Return to text.

[179] See Joyner, supra note 149, at 271. The common heritage of humankind principle would require claimant states to relinquish their claims, a scenario that will not occur. See Ellen S. Tenenbaum, A World Park in Antarctica: The Common Heritage of Mankind, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 113 (1990). "[T]he Consultative Parties are unified in their conviction that exploitation of Antarctic offshore mineral resources is not subject to regulation by the International Sea-Bed Authority." Note, Antarctic Resources Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise?, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 45, 71 (1985) [hereinafter Antarctic Resources Jurisdiction]. Return to text.

[180] See Antarctic Resources Jurisdiction, supra note 185, at 53. Return to text.

[181] Under division, Antarctica would be carved up into segments that would come under the sovereign control of states participating in division. See Peterson, supra note 96, at 391. Return to text.

[182] See id. Return to text.

[183] See WILLIAM E. WESTERMEYER, THE POLITICS OF MINERAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN ANTARCTICA: ALTERNATIVE REGIMES FOR THE FUTURE 59 (1984); see also Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 165. Return to text.

[184] In Antarctic oil exploration, free riders might monitor prospecting activities until a discovery was made. The free rider could then move in and commence exploitation without incurring the expenses of exploration. This would discourage companies from ever prospecting to begin with. Division would eliminate free riders by allowing the sovereign to allocate areas for exclusive exploration activity through licensing or permits. Return to text.

[185] See Elaine F. Foreman, Protecting the Antarctic Environment: Will a Protocol be Enough?, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 843, 848-49 (1992). Courts have held that discovery alone does not establish territorial sovereignty. See id. Discovery merely conveys an inchoate title that requires completion by occupation within a reasonable time. See id. Return to text.

[186] See Peterson, supra note 96, at 392. Greenland is one example of another remote area subjected to less severe effective occupation requirements. See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 46 (citing the Island of Palmas case, (1932) 2 UNRIAA 1105, the Clipperton Island Award, (1928) 2 UNRIAA 829, and the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 22, for the proposition that a relaxation of the traditional rule of effective occupation can be made when the land in question is essentially uninhabited merely by "effective administration"). Return to text.

[187] See Foreman, supra note 185, at 848. Some Antarctic claims do overlap. Chile's claim is largely overlapped by British and Argentinean claims. See Stoller, supra note 19, at 342. Return to text.

[188] This might satisfy critics who argue for the creation of a stronger institutional mechanism or a role for the United Nations in order to limit the Consultative Parties' control over the region. See, e.g., VICUNA, supra note 66, at 488-90. Return to text.

[189] The International Court of Justice is an organ of the United Nations which functions as an international tribunal hearing cases involving issues of international dispute. Return to text.

[190] See Lohmeier, supra note 4, at 170. Return to text.

[191] See Oxman, supra note 38, at 242-43. Laws of supply and demand dictate that if more oil is available on the market, the price of that oil will tend to decrease. Price decreases benefit consumers. Thus, more oil benefits consumers by making oil both more affordable and widely available. Return to text.

[192] See Blay, supra note 156, at 387 (asserting that since the Exxon Valdez incident, international awareness of environmental issues has significantly increased). Return to text.

[193] See State of the Environment in Antarctica and its Impact on the Global System, Report of the Secretary-General at 9, U.N. Doc. A/46/590 (1991). Return to text.

[194] Offshore oil drilling in Antarctica is almost certain to have accidents. See Deihl, supra note 92, at 449. A massive oil spill could affect heat absorption of Antarctica's ice sheet, resulting in a rise in ocean levels. See Jonathan D. Weiss, Note, The Balance of Nature and Human Needs in Antarctica: The Legality of Mining, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 387, 391 (1995). Collisions between two vessels or contact with a stationary object were the primary causes of tanker spills between 1974 and 1992. See Oil Spill Intelligence Report (Cutter Information Corporation, Arlington, Mass.), Feb. 18, 1994. Improved navigational technologies might prevent or reduce such occurrences. Return to text.

[195] See CHRISTIE, supra note 57, at 242-43. Oil spills are not the most devastating source of pollution to the seas. Intentional discharges, ocean dumping, and land-based sewage and wastes are much more destructive to the marine environment. See id. Interestingly, at least one scientific report has concluded that while some animals suffer when oil spills occur, others benefit. See William Booth, Oil Spills: Some Animals Benefit, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1989, at A2. Return to text.

[196] It was estimated that oil production in part of the Arctic would require over 200 miles of roads, 400 miles of pipelines, 51 exploratory wells, 54,275 tons of waste-drilling muds, and 3,375 helicopter flights. See D.A. Bolze & M.B. Lee, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Implications for Wildlife in Alaska, 13 MARINE POL'Y 231, 231 (1989). Advances in technology will likely reduce such intrusive activities. Return to text.

[197] For example, the 1996 Antarctic Science, Tourism, and Conservation Act required vessels under U.S. jurisdiction that transport oil in the Antarctic to amend their shipboard oil pollution emergency plans by September 30, 1997. See Vessel Operators in Antarctica Must Amend Emergency Plans, HAZMAT TRANSPORT NEWS, Apr. 15, 1997, at 52. Return to text.

[198] See Braslow, supra note 95, at 354 (discussing Section 377.2425, Florida Statutes (1995), which requires oil companies to post a bond or pay into a trust fund providing for clean-up costs in case of spills before drilling is permitted). Return to text.

[199] See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 139. Return to text.

[200] See JOHN WARREN KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1178 (1986). Return to text.

[201] See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 139. Estimates of future oil spills in the Bering Sea suggest that for every billion barrels of oil produced, four spills of 1,000 to 10,000 barrels in size, and two spills of more than 10,000 barrels can be expected. These figures would likely be higher for Antarctica due to its deeper waters and harsher climate. See id. at 137. Return to text.

[202] See Braslow, supra note 95, at 346-47. Return to text.

[203] See Ambrose O. O. Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 59 (1995). Return to text.

[204] See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 62, at 137. Return to text.

[205] See id. Return to text.

[206] See Tenenbaum, supra note 179, at 128. Return to text.

[207] The largest oil spill in history occurred on March 24, 1989, when the tanker Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef and spilled 250,000 barrels (11 million gallons) of crude oil into Prince Edward Sound. See Douglas S. Sandhaus, Should Congress Open Up the Alaskan Coastal Plain to Oil Exploration? A Discussion of Options, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 43, 47 (1992). The Exxon Valdez spill resulted in the bodies of 155 bald eagles, 36,471 other birds, and 166 sea otters recovered with estimates of actual deaths ranging from 3 to 100 times the known body count. See id. Return to text.

[208] From the moment man first set foot on Antarctica, he began to pollute it. Tin cans still sit on shelves in the hut of Captain Robert F. Scott more than 85 years after his trip to the South Pole. See Stoller, supra note 19, at 335. Wooden crates and tins still litter Ross Island; evidence of Scott and Ernest Shackleton's visits nearly a century ago. See id. at 351 n.133. Return to text.

[209] See id. at 351-52. Return to text.

[210] See id. at 352. Return to text.

[211] See Richard Roura, Greenpeace Reports Fuel Leak in Antarctic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at A5. Return to text.

[212] See Stoller, supra note 19, at 352. Return to text.

[213] See Mary Ann Cunningham, Antarctica, in ENVIRONMENTAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 44 (William P. Cunningham et al. eds., 1994). Return to text.

[214] See Stoller, supra note 19, at 359. Return to text.

[215] See Boyce Rensberger, Grounded Ship's Fuel Imperils Antarctic Coast, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1989, at A3. The wreck was not officially cleaned up until 1993. See International Argentina, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Jan. 18, 1993, at 6. Return to text.

[216] See Rensberger, supra note 215, at A3. Return to text.

[217] See Shaul, supra note 45, at 7; see also Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 14, at 178. Return to text.

[218] See Shaul, supra note 45, at 7 (noting that individual tourists bear no burden of responsibility for obeying environmental laws in Antarctica); Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 14, at 180. Return to text.

[219] Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 16, 1858) in THE LIVING LINCOLN 211-12 (Paul M. Angle & Earl Schenck Miers, eds., 1955). Return to text.

[220] See Ekpu, supra note 203, at 55. Return to text.

[221] See id. Current estimates predict that worldwide oil production will begin terminal decline around 2010. See Will Harvie, Go Abroad, Young Company, OILWEEK, June 3, 1996, at 18. Return to text.

[222] See Epku, supra note 203, at 55. Return to text.

[223] Interestingly, this clash of interests infected the formation of the Protocol because the participants in the Protocol negotiation were divided between pro-mining and pro-environment states. This polarization at the negotiations is credited with producing a flawed Protocol. See Vicuna, supra note 158, at 11. Return to text.

[224] See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 707 (1993) (predicting that environmental protection and economic development will work in increasing cooperation over the next several decades). Return to text.

[225] See Bob Davis, As the Cold War Ends, Many Nations are Cutting Their Antarctic Research, THE WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at B4. Return to text.

[226] See id. (quoting Alfred Fowler, head of Council of Managers of National Antarctic Program). Return to text.

[227] Alan Kovski, Antarctica: A Continent is Placed Off Limits to Oil Exploration, THE OIL DAILY, Oct. 8, 1991, at 2. Return to text.

[228] Of course, this suggestion assumes that keeping Antarctica in its relatively pristine form is not more valuable than exploiting its oil resources. Few would argue that a virgin Antarctica, untouched by human hands, would be wonderful. However, as this Comment points out, humanity has already left its mark on Antarctica in the form of scientific research, tourism, and the pollutants that accompany such enterprises. What is therefore both desirable and realistic is an Antarctica minimally impacted by human activity, which benefits humanity by supplying an important global resource should the need arise, without diminishing or despoiling the continent's inherent spiritual value and intrinsic wildness. See Campell-Johnson, supra note 18 (noting that "the Romantics invested the wilderness with a power that . . . reflected man's deepest spiritual and emotional needs for something greater than himself"). Return to text.

[229] See Redgwell, supra note 134, at 981 (stating that "the problem of Antarctic mineral resource activities has merely been postponed rather than resolved"). Return to text.

[230] See Deihl, supra note 92, at 424. Return to text.

[231] See Redgwell, supra note 134, at 979 ("The question remains whether the Protocol has indeed achieved the goal of settling the minerals issue without creating a legal vacuum when the prohibition is lifted."). Return to text.

[232] See Vicuna, supra note 157, at 13 (noting that "the Protocol falls far short of its proclaimed virtues"). Return to text.

[233] Any claim that the primary motivating force behind the Protocol's minerals ban provision was the desire to preserve Antarctica's virgin landscape ignores the reality of the situation. If pools of oil had been bubbling-up as the Protocol negotiations proceeded, can a serious argument be made that the Consultative Parties would not have discarded the minerals ban proposal in favor of a declaration allowing oil extraction? The fundamental rule of inter national politics that nations inherently act in their own interests, and the history of the Consultative Parties in world affairs, combine to answer with a resounding no. Acquiescence by the Consultative Parties to an Antarctic minerals ban, despite the presence of known oil fields in the area, would run counter to their own best interests. Reality dictates that such self-defeating behavior would not have occurred.

The true motivations for adopting a minerals ban derived primarily from the widespread belief that existing oil reserves would provide adequate energy sources well into the next century, the knowledge that technology was not yet available which would make oil development in the region feasible, and the fact that no confirmed oil deposits had yet been located in Antarctica. If a sizable Antarctic oil field was found today, those nations would scramble to find a way to invalidate, overturn, or amend the minerals ban, notwithstanding the Protocol's "mandate" prohibiting minerals activity for at least fifty years. In consideration of this reality, it is certainly noteworthy that during the Protocol negotiations, only 8 countries supported a total ban on future Antarctic minerals activities, while 18 preferred to refrain from burning the bridge to potential Antarctic resource enrichment. See Redgwell, supra note 134, at 978. Return to text.

[234] Oil exploration around the globe has been increasing of late. For example, Phillips Petroleum's drilling plans for the next five years calls for "a tremendous amount of international activity." See Overseas Privatization Drives Global Business Trends, Phillips Exec Says, PETROLEUM FIN. WEEK, Aug. 11, 1997. It is only a matter of time before oil companies direct a similar "tremendous amount" of exploration activities at the Antarctic region. Return to text.

[235] This is the scenario that the Protocol was intended to protect against, as the Consultative Parties adopted it in recognition of "the need to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system so as to ensure that Antarctic [sic] shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord." See Protocol, supra note 26, at Preamble. Return to text.

[236] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 43 ("The efforts of nations with a real or expected stake in Antarctica to protect their individual interests has increased the potential for international conflict."). The "will to power" and instincts of self-preservation could push nations to the brink of war. According to Nietzsche, the will to power is the fundamental driving force of humanity, consisting of a "will to appropriate, dominate, increase, grow stronger." FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 367 (Walter Kauffmann, ed., 1967). Return to text.

[237] See Hinkley, supra note 3, at 43 (addressing the various interests likely to be asserted when a minerals rush begins in Antarctica). Return to text.

[238] Such critical habitat areas could be designated in similar fashion to National Parks and Wildlife Refuges in the United States. Return to text.

[239] See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 101. Return to text.

[240] See Vicuna, supra note 157, at 3. Return to text.

[241] Enforcement could be accomplished in a variety of ways. Claimant states could enforce the regulations internally through adherence to a commonly agreed upon administrative scheme, or a special enforcement agency could be created consisting of representatives of all claimant states or all treaty members. The vital element to whatever enforcement mechanism is agreed upon is unity. All interested parties must unilaterally support and actively promote the terms of any agreement if the regime is to succeed. Return to text.

[242] See Weiss, supra note 224, at 708. Return to text.

[243] See Redgwell, supra note 134, at 980 (quoting art. 25(5) of the Protocol). Return to text.

[244] See id. Return to text.

[245] See id. at 981. Return to text.

[246] This would fail to provide for "the development of a comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems . . . in the interest of mankind as a whole." Protocol, supra note 26, at Preamble. Return to text.

[247] As one commentator remarked before the adoption of the Protocol, "[u]nless an internationally acceptable Antarctic resource regime is soon developed, conflict will inevitably arise in the Southern Ocean." Allan Young, Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 71 (1985). Due to the Protocol's shortcomings, Young's warning resonates with equal force today. Return to text.

[248] The U.S. has enacted several statutes to protect the Antarctic environment, including the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, which implements the Antarctic Treaty and prohibits the discharge of pollutants in Antarctica by U.S. citizens. See Andersen, supra note 6, at 305. Return to text.

[249] See id. at 342-43. Return to text.

[250] As the United Kingdom has stated, "there [can] be no comprehensive system for the protection of the Antarctic environment that does not deal with the long term issue of minerals . . . before the need for it arises." Redgwell, supra note 134, at 978 (citing H.C. Deb., Vol. 182, col. 61 (Dec. 4, 1990)). Waiting until extractable oil is discovered in Antarctica to address the inevitable need for sensible environmental regulations is foolhardy. Prophylactic measures must be taken before the need for them arises if the Antarctic environment is to be adequately protected. Return to text.

[251] Vicuna had the foresight to point out that "[t]here can be little doubt that minerals are available in Antarctica, and it is therefore an artifice to attempt to ignore the issue. When minerals are eventually discovered, the Protocol will prove to be fundamentally unrealistic, and its chances of survival will be virtually nil." Vicuna, supra note 158, at 11. Return to text.

[252] See Bergin, supra note 4, at 40 (warning that Antarctica "could become the setting for an international politico-legal nightmare"). Return to text.

[253] As previously mentioned in this Comment, CRAMRA could serve as an excellent framework for establishing substantive enforcement mechanisms for environmental protection of Antarctica. See CRAMRA, supra note 158, at art.3 (prohibiting Antarctic mineral resource activities outside the Convention), art. 8(2) (holding operators strictly liable for damage caused by mineral activities), art. 13 (prohibiting mineral activities in protected areas designated by the Consultative Parties), art. 37(7)(d) (requiring compilation of an environmental impact assessment prior to beginning any exploration activity), art. 53-54 (requiring environmental impact assessment and permit before any exploitation activity). These measures, conspicuously absent from the Protocol, provide an excellent framework to flesh-out a comprehensive Antarctic minerals governing agreement. Return to text.

[254] F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 189 (Collier Books 1992) (1925). Return to text.