

Appendix A

Chart 1 Game 1(A); Node I R Does Nothing	
Benefits	Value
R saves investigative resources	30
T may be deterred	5
Total Benefits	35
Costs	
T is encouraged, emboldened if learns of R's decision not to investigate	-10
T will have time to revise, improve upon its malfeasance strategies	-25
More victims will be hurt	-25
Other Ts will be encouraged, emboldened if they learn of R's decision not to investigate	-10
Total Costs	-70
Net Cost	-35

Chart 2 Game 1(A); Node II R Opens Investigation	
Benefits	Value
R deters T	25
R deters other observant businesses	25
R's opening of an investigation makes it difficult for T to continue refining its wrongdoing methodology	25
R's opening of an investigation makes it less likely T will expand its wrongdoing to include more victims	25
R develops institutional knowledge of T's behavior	25
Total Benefits	125
Costs	
R's investigation is inefficient, unfocused and unlikely to achieve full success	-25
R incurs an opportunity cost: inability to investigate other deserving Ts	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	75

Chart 3 Game 1(A); Node III R Finds Nothing; Closes Investigation	
Benefits	Value
R ends its investigative costs	25
R generates institutional knowledge	25
Total Benefits	50
Costs	
R has incurred investigative expenses with no result	-25
R is unable to protect the public	-25
R loses credibility	-25
Morale within R suffers	-25
R signals encouragement to T	-25
R signals encouragement to other observant Ts	-25
Total Costs	-150
Net Cost	-100

Chart 4 Game 1(A); Node IV R Initiates Action	
Benefits	Value
Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant businesses	25
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses against T (T's employees and competitors)	25
Enhanced morale within R	25
Minimize, if not prevent, more harm to victims	25
Deter T's wrongdoing	25
Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses	25
Total Benefits	150
Costs	
Action may not be successful due to lack of inside info.	-25
Significant investigative and litigation costs due to lack of inside information	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	100

Chart 5 Game 1(A); Node V R Wins the Action	
Benefits	Value
Public acknowledgment that T's behavior was wrong	50
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and impermissible behavior	50
Payment by T of judgment, fines, penalties	50
Enhanced credibility for R	50
Deterrence of T's wrongdoing	50
Deterrence of wrongdoing by other observant businesses	50
Total Benefits	300
Costs	
Opportunity costs: R was unable to pursue other Ts by allocating resources to this T	-25
Possible inability to recoup investigative and litigative costs from T	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	250

Chart 6 Game 1(A); Node VI R Loses the Action	
Benefits	Value
An end to R's costs	25
Possible deterrence of T	10
Possible deterrence of other observant businesses	10
Total Benefits	45
Costs	
Lost credibility	-50
Lost out-of-pocket investigative and litigative costs	-50
R incurs opportunity costs: inability to investigate other Ts	-50
R's loss signals to T and other observant businesses that they can continue their wrongdoing with impunity	-75
Total Costs	-225
Net Cost	-180

Chart 7 Game 1(B); Node I T Does Not Disclose Wrongdoing	
Benefits	Value
Avoids a finding of culpability	50
Avoids R sanctions	50
Avoid consequences that flow from R's sanctions	50
Total Benefits	150
Costs	
Uncertainty of when or if R will learn of T's wrongdoing	-25
Likelihood that R will impose greater sanctions on T if it learns of T's wrongdoing and that T had adopted a policy of nondisclosure	-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence R's assessment of T's liability	-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the ability to influence the collateral consequences of R discovering T's wrongdoing and imposing sanctions	-25
Opportunity cost: T loses the chance to minimize or manage resources T expends in responding to R	-25
Total Costs	-125
Net Benefit	25

Chart 8 Game 1(B); Node II T Discloses Wrongdoing	
Benefits	Value
End the uncertainty of whether R will discover T's wrongdoing	25
Influence R's assessment of T's culpability	50
Influence the sanctions R will seek	50
Influence the collateral consequences that flow from culpability and sanctions	50
Minimize or manage resources T spends responding to R	25
Minimize or avoid liability T, or T's executives, may incur for failing to disclose T's wrongdoing	25
Total Benefits	225
Costs	
Opportunity cost: forgoes the possibility that R would never learn of T's wrongdoing	-25
Sanctions R imposes	-50
Consequences of a finding of liability and sanctions R imposes	-50
Total Costs	-125
Net Benefit	100

Chart 9 Game 1(B); Node III T Does Not Cooperate After R Opens an Investigation	
Benefits	Value
Avoids R's finding out about T's wrongdoing	25
Avoids R's sanctions	25
Avoids collateral consequences of R's sanctions	25
Total Benefits	75
Costs	
Prospect that R will uncover T's wrongdoing	-25
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect R's assessment of T's liability	-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of sanctions R seeks	-50
Opportunity cost: loss of the ability to impact the consequences that flow from R's imposition of sanctions	-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or at least manage the resources T will expend in responding to R's investigation	-50
Total Costs	-225
Net Cost	-150

Chart 10 Game 1(B); Node IV T Cooperates After R Opens an Investigation	
Benefits	Value
T can make more informed decisions about strategy	50
T may be able to influence R's assessment of T's culpability	50
T may be able to influence the sanctions R imposes on T	50
T may be able to influence the collateral consequences for T of R's sanctions	50
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the resources T expends in responding to R's investigation	50
Total Benefits	250
Costs	
T will have to stop or cut back on wrongdoing	-25
T will spend resources in responding to R's investigation	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	200

Chart 11 Game 1(B); Node V T Does Not Cooperate After R Files Action	
Benefits	Value
T forces R to prove its case against T; T may escape liability if R cannot	25
T gets information about R's case, commitment	25
Total Benefits	50
Costs	
Uncertainty of not knowing how the action R has initiated will be resolved	-25
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect the finding of culpability on the part of T	-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of R's sanctions if R prevails in the action	-50
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the consequences that flow from R's imposition of sanctions	-50
Opportunity cost: T will be less able to manage and control its expenditures of resources in responding to R's action	-100
Total Costs	-300
Net Cost	-250

Chart 12 Game 1(B); Node VI T Cooperates After R Files an Action	
Benefits	Value
Enhanced ability to make an informed decision about future strategies	75
Ability to influence R's assessment of T's culpability in resolving the action	25
Ability to influence R's selection of sanctions against T	35
Ability to influence the consequences that befall T because of the sanctions R imposes on T	35
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the resources T expends in response to R's initiation of an action	15
Total Benefits	185
Costs	
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing	-25
T will expend resources responding to and cooperating with R's investigation	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	135

Chart 13 Game 1(B); Node VII T Loses the Action Brought By R	
Benefits	Value
An end to the tangible and intangible costs T was incurring in litigating the action against R	10
An end to the uncertainty in which T was operating since R first opened its investigation	10
Restructuring within T that possibly renders T a more effective business overall	10
Total Benefits	30
Costs	
Lingering effects of T's response to R's investigation and action	-100
Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring	-300
Total Costs	-400
Net Cost	-370

Chart 14 Game 1(B); Node VIII T Wins the Action Brought By R	
Benefits	Value
Avoids sanctions that accompany a finding of liability	200
Enhances T's image as a "winner"	50
Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in question (if propriety of such behavior was an issue)	20
An end to the uncertainty about and within T after R opened its investigation	20
Total Benefits	290
Costs	
Possible lingering effects of the expense (tangible and intangible) in responding to the investigation and defending the action brought	-15
Total Costs	-15
Net Benefit	275

Chart 15 Game 1(C); Node I P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T's Wrongdoing	
Benefits	Value
P will not precipitate retaliation by T	50
P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional hardships associated with whistleblowing	50
Total Benefits	100
Costs	
T's wrongdoing may undermine P's professional security	-20
P may end up being held culpable for T's wrongdoing	-20
P may experience personal angst for not reporting T's wrongdoing	-20
Total Costs	-60
Net Benefit	40

Chart 16 Game 1(C); Node II P Reports T's Wrongdoing Internally	
Benefits	Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T	40
Demonstrating leadership; as a result, P advances within T	40
Minimizing or preventing P's personal angst	20
Total Benefits	100
Costs	
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within the relevant industry	-40
P's time and energy	-20
Personal and/or professional hardships as a result of reporting the wrongdoing	-40
Total Costs	-100
Net Benefit	0

Chart 17 Game 1(C); Node III P Reports T's Wrongdoing Externally	
Benefits	Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T	50
Demonstrating leadership; as a result P advances within T	30
Minimizing or preventing P's personal angst for failure to report	30
Demonstrate P's non-culpability	50
Obtains some protection against T's retaliation of P	50
Motivate T to remedy the situation	50
Total Benefits	260
Costs	
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within relevant industry; personal or professional hardships result for P	-160
P's time and energy	-40
Personal discomfort at becoming a public figure	-25
Total Costs	-225
Net Benefit	35

Chart 18 Game 2(A); Node I R Conducts Only a Minimal Investigation	
Benefits	Value
T is deterred from its wrongful activity if T learns that R is aware of T's activity	100
Saves resources	5
Total Benefits	105
Costs	
T is encouraged, emboldened if learns of R's decision to only do a minimal investigation	-10
Other Ts will be encouraged, emboldened if they learn of R's decision to only do a minimal investigation	-10
T will have time to revise, improve upon its malfeasance strategies	-25
More victims will be hurt	-25
Signals to possible Ps within T that R is not responsive to them	-25
Signals to Ps in general that R is not responsive	-25
Encourages T and other aware businesses to retaliate against Ps	-25
Total Costs	-145
Net Cost	-40

Chart 19 Game 2(A); Node II R Actively Investigates T	
Benefits	Value
R deters T	35
R deters other observant businesses	35
R develops institutional knowledge	50
R signals support to future Ps	50
Total Benefits	170
Costs	
Investigative costs	-35
Opportunity cost: inability to investigate other deserving Ts	-15
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	120

Chart 20 Game 2(A); Node III R Declines to Intervene in P's Action	
Benefits	Value
Save resources	125
Chance of sharing in any judgment P obtains	25
Total Benefits	150
Costs	
Doom meritorious P case to dismissal or realization of less success than case warrants	-35
Less able to guide P's exercise of prosecutorial discretion	-40
Empower T and observant businesses	-75
Lose opportunity to shape norms (i.e., to encourage view of whistle blowers as courageous persons, not traitors)	-75
Total Costs	-225
Net Cost	-75

Chart 21 Game 2(A); Node IV R Intervenes in P's Action	
Benefits	Value
Enhanced credibility for R among T and other observant businesses	30
Enhanced credibility for R among potential witnesses against T (T's employees and competitors)	30
Enhanced morale within R	30
Minimize if not prevent more harm to victims	30
Deter T's wrongdoing	30
Deter wrongdoing by other observant businesses	30
Signals encouragement to future Ps	30
Total Benefits	210
Costs	
Investigative costs	-10
Opportunity cost: R cannot pursue other deserving Ts	-10
Total Costs	-20
Net Benefit	190

Chart 22 Game 2(A); Node V R and P Win the Action	
Benefits	Value
Public acknowledgment that T's behavior was wrong	75
Education of relevant industry as to permissible and impermissible behavior	75
Enhances R's credibility	75
Payment by T as judgment, fines, penalties	75
Deterrence of T's wrongdoing	75
Deterrence of other observant businesses	75
Signal encouragement to future Ps	75
Total Benefits	525
Costs	
Opportunity cost: lost opportunity to pursue other Ts	-15
Investigative and litigative costs	-15
Total Costs	-30
Net Benefit	495

Chart 23 Game 2(A); Node VI R and P Lose the Action	
Benefits	Value
An end to R's investigative and litigative costs	25
Possible deterrence of T and other observant businesses	20
Total Benefits	45
Costs	
Lost credibility	-75
Lost tangible and intangible expenses in pursuing the action	-50
Opportunity cost: unable to pursue other deserving Ts	-50
R and P's loss signals to T and other observant businesses that they can continue their wrongdoing	-75
R signals discouragement to future Ps	-75
Total Costs	-325
Net Cost	-280

Chart 24 Game 2(B); Node I T Does Not Disclose	
Benefits	Value
Avoids a finding of culpability	35
Avoids R sanctions	35
Avoid consequences that flow from R's sanctions	35
Total Benefits	105
Costs	
Uncertainty in whether R will learn of T's wrongdoing	-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact R's assessment of T's culpability	-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the severity of sanctions R seeks against T	-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the collateral consequences of a finding of culpability and imposition of sanctions	-35
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage the resources T will expend in responding to R's investigation	-35
Total Costs	-175
Net Cost	-70

Chart 25 Game 2(B); Node II T Discloses	
Benefits	Value
End the uncertainty of whether R will discover T's wrongdoing	50
Affect R's assessment of T's culpability	100
Affect R's assessment of what sanctions to seek if T is found culpable	100
Affect the collateral consequences that flow from a finding of culpability for T and imposition of sanctions on T	100
Minimize or manage the resources T expends in responding to any investigation R might initiate	50
Total Benefits	400
Costs	
Opportunity cost: foregoes the possibility that R would never learn of T's wrongdoing	-50
Sanctions	-100
Collateral consequences that flow from a finding of culpability and sanctions	-100
Total Costs	-250
Net Benefit	150

Chart 26 Game 2(B); Node III T Does Not Cooperate When R Begins an Investigation	
Benefits	Value
Avoids a finding of culpability	10
Avoids R's sanctions	10
Avoids collateral consequences of sanctions	10
Total Benefits	30
Costs	
Uncertainty in not knowing if R may initiate an action against T	-20
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to influence R's assessment of T's liability	-75
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect the severity of R's sanctions	-75
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the collateral consequences that flow from R's sanctions	-75
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage resources T expends in responding to R's investigation	-75
Total Costs	-320
Net Cost	-290

Chart 27 Game 2(B); Node IV T Cooperates When R Begins an Investigation	
Benefits	Value
T can make more informed decisions about strategy	75
Ability to influence R's assessment of T's culpability	75
Ability to influence the sanctions R seeks to impose on T	75
Ability to influence the collateral consequences for T of R's sanctions	75
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the resources T expends in responding to R's investigation	75
Total Benefits	375
Costs	
T will spend resources in responding to R's investigation	-25
T will have to stop or cut back on wrongdoing	-20
Total Costs	-45
Net Benefit	330

Chart 28 Game 2(B); Node V T Does Not Cooperate When R Joins P's Action	
Benefits	Value
T forces R and P to prove their case against T without T's help	15
Information about the case against T	35
Total Benefits	50
Costs	
Uncertainty of not knowing how the action R has initiated will be resolved	-10
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to influence R's assessment of T's culpability	-25
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to affect severity of R's sanctions if R prevails in the action	-100
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to impact the consequences that flow from R's imposition of sanctions	-100
Opportunity cost: loss of ability to minimize or manage expenditure of resources in responding to R's action	-100
Encourage the adjudicating authority to impose harsher sanctions on T if liability is found on grounds that T's noncooperation unnecessarily consumed judicatory resources	-30
Total Costs	-365
Net Cost	-315

Chart 29 Game 2(B); Node VI T Cooperates When R Initiates Action	
Benefits	Value
Enhanced ability to make an informed decision about future strategies	75
Ability to influence R's assessment of T's culpability	25
Ability to influence R's selection of sanctions against T	40
Ability to influence the consequences that befall T because of the sanctions R imposes on T	40
Ability to minimize and manage, at least somewhat, the resources T expends in response to R's initiation of an action	40
Total Benefits	220
Costs	
T will have to stop or curtail its wrongdoing	-25
T will expend resources responding to and cooperating with R's investigation	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	170

Chart 30 Game 2(B); Node VII T Does Not Cooperate When P Continues the Action	
Benefits	Value
Opportunity to avoid liability	60
Opportunity to avoid sanctions	50
Opportunity to avoid collateral sanctions	50
Total Benefits	160
Costs	
Uncertainty of whether P will prevail	-5
Opportunity cost: to influence settlement	-20
Opportunity cost: to influence collateral consequences of the settlement	-20
Opportunity cost: to minimize and manage resources T devotes to responding to P's suit	-20
Encourages the adjudicating authority to impose harsher sanctions on T if T is found liable	-5
Total Costs	-70
Net Benefit	90

Chart 31 Game 2(B); Node VIII T Cooperates When P Continues the Action	
Benefits	Value
Learn more about P's case; enhanced ability to make informed decisions about future strategy	25
Ability to favorably influence settlement	15
Ability to favorably influence collateral consequences of settlement	15
Ability to minimize, manage T's resources consumed by responding to P's suit	15
Total Benefits	70
Costs	
Helping P when P couldn't win otherwise	-200
T has stop or curtail wrongdoing	-25
Resources (tangible and intangible) expended to cooperate	-25
Total Costs	-250
Net Cost	-180

Chart 32 Game 2(B); Node IX T Loses the Action	
Benefits	Value
An end to the tangible and intangible expenses T was incurring in litigating the action brought against it	10
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the ongoing litigation	10
Restructuring within T that could make T a more effective business entity	30
Total Benefits	50
Costs	
Lingering effects of the investigation and action	-100
Fines, damages, mandated internal restructuring	-300
Empowering whistle blowers to come forward	-50
Greater intolerance of financial aggression and resulting consequences	-50
Total Costs	-500
Net Cost	-450

Chart 33 Game 2(B); Node X T Wins the Action	
Benefits	Value
Avoids the consequences that accompany a finding of liability	200
Enhances T's image as a "winner"	40
Obtains acquiescence to the behavior of T that was in question (if propriety of such behavior was in question)	40
An end to the uncertainty created for T because of the ongoing litigation	40
Generates publicity that may discourage future whistleblowers	50
Total Benefits	370
Costs	
Lingering effects of the expenditure of costs in defending itself	-15
Publicity may inform future whistle blowers	-10
Total Costs	-25
Net Benefit	345

Chart 34 Game 2(C); Node I P Does Nothing Upon Learning of T's Wrongdoing	
Benefits	Value
P will not precipitate retaliation by T	75
P will not incur T-imposed personal or professional hardships associated with whistleblowing	75
Total Benefits	150
Costs	
T's wrongdoing may undermine P's professional security	-50
P may be held culpable for T's wrongdoing	-50
P may experience personal angst for not reporting T's wrongdoing	-20
Opportunity cost: P will lose the opportunity to be a qui tam relator and share in any judgment obtained	-100
Total Costs	-220
Net Cost	-70

Chart 35 Game 2(C); Node II P Reports T's Wrongdoing Internally	
Benefits	Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T	40
P is viewed as demonstrating leadership; as a result, P advances within T	40
Minimizing or preventing P's personal angst	20
Secures protection under the FCA against retaliation by T	50
Total Benefits	150
Costs	
Possible retaliation by T and/or others within relevant industry	-30
P's time and energy	-20
P suffers personal and/or professional hardships as a result of reporting internally	-30
Risks preemption by a P who reports externally	-40
Total Costs	-120
Net Benefit	30

Chart 36 Game 2(C); Node III P Reports T's Wrongdoing Externally	
Benefits	Value
Possible prevention of future problems for T	60
P is viewed as demonstrating leadership; as a result P advances within T	40
Minimizing or preventing P's personal angst for failure to report	40
Demonstrates P's non-culpability	60
Secures protection under the FCA against retaliation by T	60
Motivates T to remedy the situation	60
Through the FCA, P obtains a mechanism for reporting T's wrongdoing to a particularly effective outside source, the DOJ	75
Obtains benefit of counsel and support organizations counsel will know about	25
May qualify as qui tam relator who will share in any judgment obtained in a qui tam lawsuit	50
Total Benefits	470
Costs	
Increased likelihood of personal or professional hardship resulting from P's whistleblowing, especially ostracization by colleagues	-200
P's time and energy	-40
P's discomfort in becoming a public figure	-25
Cost of counsel (not compensated otherwise)	-15
Total Costs	-280
Net Benefit	190

Chart 37 Game 2(C); Node IV P Works Actively With R	
Benefits	Value
Increases P's percentage of any judgment obtained T by actively working with R	50
P's counsel will encourage P to work actively with R	50
P has a greater chance of influencing the outcome of the case by actively working with R	50
P increases P's personal and professional satisfaction by actively working with R	50
Total Benefits	200
Costs	
P's time and energy	-25
Emotional stress	-25
Total Costs	-50
Net Benefit	150

Chart 38 Game 2(C); Node V P Decided Not to Work Actively With R	
Benefits	Value
Conserves P's time and energy	25
Minimizes P's emotional stress	25
Total Benefits	50
Costs	
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to increase the percentage of recovery P is possibly awarded	-50
Opportunity cost: P's counsel loses the opportunity to earn larger attorneys fees compensated under the statute and a larger percentage of recovery; P may lose experienced counsel	-50
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to influence R's conduct of the case	-50
Opportunity cost: P loses the opportunity to gain personal and professional satisfaction by working actively with R	-50
Total Costs	-200
Net Cost	-150

Chart 39 Game 2(C); Node VI P Continues in the Case as Co-Plaintiff With R After R Intervenes	
Benefits	Value
P (with R) will likely prevail in the suit	100
P will prevail without expending significant tangible resources	100
P will be protected against retaliation by T under the FCA	50
Total Benefits	250
Costs	
P's time and energy	-25
Emotional stress	-25
Ostracization by friends, colleagues	-25
Future employment difficulties	-25
Total Costs	-100
Net Benefit	150

Chart 40 Game 2(C); Node VII P Pursues Action Alone After R Declines to Intervene	
Benefits	Value
P may win the action	15
If P wins the action, P would be statutorily entitled to a larger percentage of the judgment (25-30%) if P pursues the action alone than if R joins (15-25%)	15
Total Benefits	30
Costs	
Poor chance P will win the action	-100
Tangible and intangible costs in pursuing action without R	-100
Loss of experienced counsel	-25
Greater risk of retaliation	-25
Total Costs	-250
Net Cost	-220

Chart 41 Game 2(C); Node VIII P Dismisses the Action After R Declines to Intervene	
Benefits	Value
P avoids tangible and intangible costs	50
P minimizes the risk of retaliation	20
Total Benefits	70
Costs	
Opportunity cost: P may win the action	-5
Opportunity cost: If P won the action, P would be entitled to a larger percentage of the recovery because P pursued the case alone	-5
Total Costs	-10
Net Benefit	60

Chart 42 Game 2(C); Node IX P Wins the Action	
Benefits	Value
Monetary recovery	300
Public vindication	75
An end to an emotionally draining experience	50
Total Benefits	425
Costs	
Emotional strain	-50
Ostracization by colleagues, friends and within one's profession	-50
Total Costs	-100
Net Benefit	325

Chart 43 Game 2(C); Node X P Loses the Action	
Benefits	Value
End an emotionally draining experience	20
Total Benefits	20
Costs	
Opportunity cost: lost opportunity for a large financial recovery	-125
Ostracization from friends, colleagues	-125
Difficulty finding new employment	-125
Lingering effects (psychological and physical) from the emotional strain of serving as a whistleblower	-125
Total Costs	-500
Net Cost	-480

Appendix B, Game 1(A)

Appendix B, Game 1(B)

Appendix B, Game 1(C)


Appendix B, Game 2(A)

Appendix B, Game 2(B)

Appendix B, Game 2(C)

Appendix C, Chart C1

Change in Players' Payoff When Private Parties Join The Regulatory Game



Appendix C, Chart C2

Games From R's Perspective			
Node	Event	Game 1 (A) No FCA	Game 2 (A) With FCA
Node I	R does nothing	-35	-40
Node II	R opens investigation	75	120
Node III	R closes investigation	-100	(R Declines to intervene) -75
Node IV	R initiates action	100	(R intervenes) 190
Node V	R wins	250	495
Node VI	R loses	-180	-280

Chart C3

Games From T's Perspective			
Node	Event	Game 1 (B) No FCA	Game 2 (B) With FCA
Node I	T does not disclose	25	-70
Node II	T discloses	100	150
Node III	T does not cooperate in investigation	-150	-290
Node IV	T cooperates in investigation	200	330
Node V	T does not cooperate after suit is filed	-250	-315
Node VI	T cooperates after suit filed	135	170
Node VII	T does not cooperate with P after R declines to intervene	-----	95
Node VIII	T cooperates with P after R declines to intervene	-----	-180
Node IX	T loses	-370	-450
Node X	T wins	275	345

Note: For comparison purposes, Game 1(B) nodes VII and VIII are listed as nodes IX and X respectively in Chart C3.

Appendix C, Chart C4

Games From P's Perspective			
Node	Event	Game 1 (C) No FCA	Game 2 (C) With FCA
Node I	P does nothing	40	-70
Node II	P reports internally	0	30
Node III	P reports externally	35	190
Node IV	P works actively with R during investigation	-----	150
Node V	P chooses not to work with R in investigation	-----	-150
Node VI	P continued in case as a co-plaintiff	-----	150
Node VII	P pursues action alone	-----	-220
Node VIII	P dismisses action	-----	60
Node IX	P wins action	-----	325
Node X	P loses action	-----	-480