[*] Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. A.B., 1979, Kenyon College; J.D., 1989, University of Florida; LL.M., 1991, University of Illinois. Return to text.

[1] See Andrew E. Taslitz, Essay, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143 (1991) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (1990)); Robert Batey, Book Review, 48 TENN. L. REV. 805 (1981) (reviewing JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1981)). Return to text.

[2] YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1994). Return to text.

[3] CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION—LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (The Michie Company 1993). Return to text.

[4] Those are searches and seizures (223 pp.), interrogation (95 pp.), identification procedures (35 pp.), entrapment and undercover practices (26 pp.), and remedies (81 pp.). Return to text.

[5] See, e.g., Norman Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Culpability: Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAW & HUM. BEH. 447 (1995); Christopher Slobogin et al., The Feasibility of a Brief Evaluation of Mental State at the Time of the Offense, 8 LAW & HUM. BEH. 305 (1984). Return to text.

[6] See STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (2d ed. 1993). Return to text.

[7] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 445. Return to text.

[8] 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Return to text.

[9] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 55-8. Return to text.

[10] Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 FLA. L. REV. 653, 658-66 (1987). Return to text.

[11] Id. at 674-82, 685 (advocating a regime of "presumptive linkage" as modified by a "cautious version" of new federalism). Return to text.

[12] In a rare lapse, Slobogin departs from the sequence set forth in his four-step "Structure of Fourth Amendment Analysis," which states that the first step is an inquiry into whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated but then begins with the components of a valid warrant. SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 102-04. Return to text.

[13] Id. at 105-13. Return to text.

[14] Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Return to text.

[15] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 158 (citing John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 70, 72-84 (1982)). Return to text.

[16] Id. at 158 (citing James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985)). Return to text.

[17] See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 70-88 (1991). Return to text.

[18] Haddad, supra note 16, at 655-57. Return to text.

[19] Id. at 651-53. Return to text.

[20] 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Return to text.

[21] E.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980) (a search "incident to" arrest may precede the arrest if there is probable cause for the arrest prior to the search; that is, the search is valid even without the officer's first demonstrating the intent to arrest). Return to text.

[22] 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Return to text.

[23] 455 U.S. 1 (1982); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 273. Return to text.

[24] 399 U.S. 42 (1970); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 279. Return to text.

[25] 414 U.S. 218 (1973); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 276. Return to text.

[26] 448 U.S. 98 (1980); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 547. Return to text.

[27] 495 U.S. 1 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 285. Return to text.

[28] 494 U.S. 14 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 554. Return to text.

[29] 494 U.S. 325 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 271. Return to text.

[30] 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Return to text.

[31] 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Return to text.

[32] 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Return to text.

[33] 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Return to text.

[34] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 145 (quoting William Raspberry, Rules Different for Young Blacks, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1992, at A19). Return to text.

[35] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 201-05 (reproducing Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993)). Return to text.

[36] 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Return to text.

[37] 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Return to text.

[38] 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Return to text.

[39] 365 U.S. 610 (1961). Return to text.

[40] 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Return to text.

[41] See Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993). Return to text.

[42] Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53. Return to text.

[43] It is not that property rights are "only marginally relevant" to Fourth Amendment cases, the Court recently explained; rather, as Hayden and Katz recognized that "protection of privacy" is the "'principal' object of the Amendment," property no longer is "the sole measure" of protection. But this is not to say, added the Court, that "this shift in emphasis had snuffed out" the relevance of property law to Fourth Amendment cases. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 544-45 (1992). Return to text.

[44] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). Return to text.

[45] Yeager, supra note 41, at 253. Return to text.

[46] Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Return to text.

[47] Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984) ("[T]he common law of trespass furthers a range of interests that have nothing to do with privacy . . . ."). Return to text.

[48] Yeager, supra note 41, at 251-52. Return to text.

[49] United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Return to text.

[50] Yeager, supra note 41, at 275 (citations omitted). Return to text.

[51] 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Return to text.

[52] 480 U.S. 294 (1987). Return to text.

[53] 466 U.S. 109 (1984). Return to text.

[54] Id. at 125. Return to text.

[55] Id. Return to text.

[56] Id. at 125 n.28. Return to text.

[57] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 195 n.10. Return to text.

[58] See also SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 314-21 (more on seizures of property, especially the law of forfeitures). Return to text.

[59] 392 U.S. 1 (1988). Return to text.

[60] Id. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring). Return to text.

[61] See id. at 7, 11, 19 n.16, 34. Return to text.

[62] E.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 171, 204 (6th ed. 1995). Return to text.

[63] 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Return to text.

[64] 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Return to text.

[65] See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Return to text.

[66] 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Return to text.

[67] 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Return to text.

[68] 495 U.S. 1 (1990). Return to text.

[69] E.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990). Return to text.

[70] 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Return to text.

[71] 462 U.S. 640 (1983). Return to text.

[72] See LaFave, supra note 69, at 456-57. Return to text.

[73] 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Return to text.

[74] Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591, 632 (1990) (footnote omitted). Return to text.

[75] Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980). Return to text.

[76] Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987). Return to text.

[77] Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990). Return to text.

[78] See Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1990). Return to text.

[79] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 378 (citing William Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989)). Return to text.

[80] 441 U.S. 369 (1979). Return to text.

[81] Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 706 (1988); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1986). Return to text.

[82] Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1993). Return to text.

[83] Dripps, supra note 74, at 593. Return to text.

[84] Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1775 n.233 (1991). Return to text.

[85] Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and Individualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 691 (1994) (citing Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753). Return to text.

[86] Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 442 (1980). Return to text.

[87] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 393 (referring to defendants in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)). Return to text.

[88] 468 U.S. 420 (1984); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 352. Return to text.

[89] 429 U.S. 492 (1977); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 353. Return to text.

[90] 496 U.S. 292 (1990); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 362. Return to text.

[91] 467 U.S. 649 (1985); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 365. Return to text.

[92] 470 U.S. 298 (1985); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 555. Return to text.

[93] 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 383. Return to text.

[94] SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 498 n.4. Return to text.

[95] See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties To Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 54-57 (1993). Return to text.

[96] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 443. Return to text.

[97] 251 U.S. 385 (1920); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 485, 548. Return to text.

[98] 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (no exclusion of statements overheard when trespass into defendant's office did not facilitate later, nontrespassory installation of listening device on wall of adjoining office). Return to text.

[99] WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4(a), at 378-88 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3, at 739-42 (1984 & Supp. 1991). Return to text.

[100] 467 U.S. 431 (1984); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 556. Return to text.

[101] 435 U.S. 268 (1978); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 553. Return to text.

[102] 445 U.S. 463 (1980); SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 562. Return to text.

[103] 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Return to text.

[104] Brent D. Stratton, Comment, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1984). Return to text.

[105] Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. Return to text.

[106] THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 550 (1970). Return to text.

[107] Id. at 510. Return to text.

[108] Stratton, supra note 104, at 153-54. Return to text.

[109] Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. Return to text.

[110] 371 U.S. 471, 486-91 (1963); see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 145-47 (1962); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961). Return to text.

[111] Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)). Return to text.

[112] Id. at 486. Return to text.

[113] 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Return to text.

[114] Id. at 604. Return to text.

[115] Stratton, supra note 104, at 148. Return to text.

[116] See Daniel Yeager, MARLOWE'S FAUSTUS: CONTRACT AS METAPHOR?, 2 U. OF CHI. LAW SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 599, 601 (1995). Return to text.

[117] See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627, 1630-33 (1993) (mapping philosophical strategies onto a Supreme Court case on the "voluntariness" of a confession). Return to text.