[*] Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. B.A., University of North Carolina, 1961; LL.B., University of North Carolina, 1963. Return to text.

[**] Member, North Carolina State Bar. Associate, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. B.S.E.E., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1990; M.S.E.E., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1992; J.D., cum laude, Wake Forest University, 1994. Former judicial clerk to the Honorable Alvin A. Schall, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Former judicial clerk to the Honorable Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Return to text.

[1] See, e.g., Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 103 (8th Cir. 1969) (noting that aspects of the issue have "plagued the courts for centuries"); Michael H. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Critique and Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 576 (1979) ("In modern litigation the use of prior consistent statements has become exceedingly confused and complex."); Annotation, Admissibility of Previous Statements by a Witness out of Court Consistent with His Testimony, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 857, 858 (1913) (stating that the admissibility of prior consistent statements "is as perplexing as any in the law of evidence") [hereinafter 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)]. Return to text.

[2] See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 696-710 (1995), aff'g 3 F.3d 342 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1448-51 (8th Cir. 1993). Return to text.

[3] See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Return to text.

[4] See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991); Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (M.D. Fla. 1995). Return to text.

[5] See Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (1975). Return to text.

[6] See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). Return to text.

[7] Id. Return to text.

[8] 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995). Return to text.

[9] See infra Part II.B.1. Return to text.

[10] See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700. Return to text.

[11] The terms "premotive" and "postmotive" are employed throughout this Article as short-hand for, respectively, before and after "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive" (the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and many common-law courts). Return to text.

[12] See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Foreword: Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of a Criminal Evidence Decision, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 843 (1995); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283 (1995); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329 (1995); Christopher A. Jones, Note, Clinging to History: The Supreme Court (Mis)Interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as Containing a Temporal Requirement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 459 (1995). Return to text.

[13] See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1123, at 254 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972); John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 446-47 (1904). Return to text.

[14] See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1123, at 254. Return to text.

[15] See 5 id. § 1364, at 18. Return to text.

[16] See 5 id. Return to text.

[17] See 4 id. § 1123, at 254. Return to text.

[18] See 4 id. § 1123, at 254-55. Return to text.

[19] See 4 id. § 1123, at 254; 5 id. § 1364, at 20. Return to text.

[20] GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 108 (photo. reprint, Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1754). For an interesting look at Gilbert's evidentiary work, see Judy M. Cornett, The Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 165 (1994). Return to text.

[21] See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1123, at 254. Return to text.

[22] See Graham, supra note 1, at 577-78; see also United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 349, 352 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) ("No principle in the law of evidence is better settled than" the rule that direct testimony supporting a witness's credibility "is not to be heard except in reply" to an opposing party's impeachment attempt). Return to text.

[23] See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1124, at 255. Return to text.

[24] See 4 id. Return to text.

[25] E.g., State v. Parish, 79 N.C. 610, 613 (1878). Return to text.

[26] "Impeachment" includes "attempted impeachment" as applicable throughout this discussion. What constitutes sufficient "impeachment" to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the common law is beyond the scope of this Article. Return to text.

[27] See, e.g., Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 491-92 (1850); Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63 (1871). Return to text.

[28] See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1124. Return to text.

[29] See 3A id. § 1018, at 996 (discussing self-contradiction and observing that "the whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied"); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1970). Return to text.

[30] See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1948). Professor Morgan reasoned that "[w]hen the Declarant is also a witness, it is difficult to justify classifying as hearsay evidence of his own prior statements. This is especially true where Declarant as a witness is giving as part of his testimony his own prior statement." Id.; see also Edmund M. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1937). Return to text.

[31] See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 224, at 458 (1954); 2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251, at 117 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 573, 575-88 (1947). Return to text.

[32] See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 333 (1961) (describing the "practical absurdity in many instances [of] treating the out of court statement of the witness himself as hearsay"). Return to text.

[33] The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See generally Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 479, 479-646 (1956).

The American Law Institute promulgated the Model Code of Evidence. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). Professor Morgan served as reporter for the Model Code, while Dean Wigmore served as chief consultant. See id. at iii-iv. Return to text.

[34] The Uniform Rules of Evidence defined as nonhearsay "[a] statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness." UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953). In 1974, the Uniform Rules of Evidence abandoned this position and generally conformed to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (1974). Return to text.

[35] See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942). "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable to testify, or (b) is present and subject to cross-examination." Id. Return to text.

[36] See 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5005, at 91-92 (1977). Return to text.

[37] See 21 id. § 5005, at 88-89. As a result of the Nebraska Supreme Court's adoption of the Model Code of Evidence, the Nebraska Legislature repealed the court's rulemaking power and rejected the Model Code. See 21 id. § 5005, at 89 & n.80 (citing Edmund M. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEX. L. REV. 587, 599 (1951)). Return to text.

[38] See, e.g., Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 491-92 (1850); Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931); Dwyer v. State, 145 A.2d 100, 109-10 (Me. 1958); Commonwealth v. Retkovitz, 110 N.E. 293, 297-99 (Mass. 1915); State v. Flint, 14 A. 178, 184-86 (Vt. 1888); see also Annotation, Admissibility, for Purposes of Supporting Impeached Witnesses, of Prior Statements by Him Consistent with His Testimony, 75 A.L.R.2D 909, 935-50 (1961) (citing cases) [hereinafter 75 A.L.R.2D]; Annotation, Admissibility, for Purpose of Supporting Impeached Witness, of Prior Statements by Him Consistent with His Testimony, 140 A.L.R. 21, 78-129 (1942) (citing cases) [hereinafter 140 A.L.R.].

Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger note that "[p]rior to the federal rules, the courts were virtually unanimous in allowing" prior consistent statements to be used following impeachment by this method. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-149 to -150 (1996). Return to text.

[39] See, e.g., Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 439; Ryan v. UPS, 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953); People v. Walsh, 301 P.2d 247, 250-51 (Cal. 1956); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (N.Y. 1949); see also 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 944-46 (citing cases); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 117-21 (citing cases). Return to text.

[40] See sources cited supra note 39. Return to text.

[41] See sources cited supra note 39. Return to text.

[42] See sources cited supra note 39. Return to text.

[43] United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); see also United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 1970); Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Alaska 1980) (Matthews, J., concurring). Return to text.

[44] See, e.g., United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1972); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324, 328 (1848). Return to text.

[45] See, e.g., Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1134-35; Copes, 345 F.2d at 725. Return to text.

[46] It is important to note that an attack on a witness's memory often, but not always, includes a charge of recent fabrication. Return to text.

[47] See, e.g., Applebaum v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 n.6 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1956); People v. Basnett, 8 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810-11 (Ct. App. 1960); Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. 1951); Openshaw v. Adams, 445 P.2d 663, 668-69 (Idaho 1968); Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 227 (Md. 1912); People v. Mann, 212 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Slocinski, 197 A. 560, 562 (N.H. 1938); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 250 (1878); see also Graham, supra note 1, at 605-06 (noting that prior consistent statements properly support such an attack "if the statement was made shortly after the event in question"); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 47, at 178 n.18 ("If the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support."); 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 929-30 (citing cases); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 48-49 (citing cases). Courts hold similarly today. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of Impeached Witness' Prior Consistent Statement—Modern State Civil Cases, 59 A.L.R.4TH 1000, 1023 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (citing cases) [hereinafter 59 A.L.R.4TH]; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of Impeached Witness' Prior Consistent Statement—Modern State Criminal Cases, 58 A.L.R.4TH 1014, 1051-53 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (citing cases) [hereinafter 58 A.L.R.4TH]. Return to text.

[48] Openshaw, 445 P.2d at 669. Return to text.

[49] Thomas, 78 A.2d at 542 (quoting Jones, 80 N.C. at 250) (internal quotation marks omitted). Return to text.

[50] Applebaum, 472 F.2d at 62. Return to text.

[51] See, e.g., id. at 61-62; Jones, 80 N.C. at 250; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 47, at 178 n.18. Return to text.

[52] See, e.g., People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85, 90-91 (1874); People v. Kinney, 95 N.E. 756, 757 (N.Y. 1911); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 79 N.E. 235, 236-37 (Ohio 1906); Green v. State, 110 S.W. 929, 929-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908); see also Graham, supra note 1, at 605-06; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 47-48. The common-law trend throughout the twentieth century, however, was to admit prior consistent statements following an attack on a witness's memory. Return to text.

[53] See, e.g., Kinney, 95 N.E. at 757 ("It is sufficient to state somewhat dogmatically that this evidence [a prior consistent statement regarding identification] was utterly incompetent, for this is so baldly the law that there is no chance for debate or discussion."). Return to text.

[54] See sources cited supra note 47. Return to text.

[55] E.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949). Return to text.

[56] See Graham, supra note 1, at 582-83. Return to text.

[57] WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 443 (1989). Return to text.

[58] See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 38-39. Return to text.

[59] E.g., Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. 1951). Return to text.

[60] Professor Michael Graham refers to this type of impeachment as "naked impeachment." Graham, supra note 1, at 594. Return to text.

[61] Mere contradiction evidence usually takes the form of a witness whose testimony portrays a different version of the matter about which a previous witness testified. Many courts decline to admit prior consistent statements to rebut such impeachment. See, e.g., Inman Bros. v. Dudley & Daniels Lumber Co., 146 F. 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1906); Evans v. State, 22 S.E. 298, 298-99 (Ga. 1894); People v. Katz, 103 N.E. 305, 312-13 (N.Y. 1913); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1127, at 267; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 38-42 (citing cases).

A very small minority of courts, however, ruled such statements admissible following contradiction evidence. See, e.g., Mallonee v. Duff, 19 A. 708, 708-09 (Md. 1890); State v. Rhyne, 13 S.E. 943, 943-44 (N.C. 1891); see also 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 42-47 (citing cases). Dean Wigmore described these courts as "misled." 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1127, at 267. Return to text.

[62] 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1127, at 267. Return to text.

[63] See, e.g., Edwards v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W. 1046, 1047 (Ky. 1911); Lyles v. State, 239 S.W. 446, 449-50 (Tenn. 1922); Thurmond v. State, 11 S.W. 451, 452 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1125, at 258; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 34-35 (citing cases). A few courts, however, admitted prior consistent statements to rebut the impeachment of the declarant's moral character. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 4 S.E. 506, 509-10 (N.C. 1887); Zell v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 258, 267 (1880); see also 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 35-36 (citing cases). Return to text.

[64] See, e.g., Yoder v. United States, 71 F.2d 85, 89 (10th Cir. 1934); McKelton v. State, 6 So. 301, 301 (Ala. 1889); Mason v. Vestal, 26 P. 213, 213-14 (Cal. 1891); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1125, at 258; 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 927-28 (citing cases); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 36-37 (citing cases). A few courts, however, admitted prior consistent statements to rebut such impeachment. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 468 P.2d 143, 149 (Kan. 1970); State v. Dove, 32 N.C. 469, 474-75 (1849); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1125, at 258; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 37 (citing cases). Return to text.

[65] "The admission of prior consistent statements to support a witness impeached by prior inconsistent statements has plagued the courts for centuries . . . ." Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 103 (8th Cir. 1968). Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is also called self-contradiction. See id. Return to text.

[66] See, e.g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Gelbin v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 62 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1933); American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Hogan, 213 F. 416, 420-21 (1st Cir. 1914); Baker v. People, 209 P. 791, 793 (Colo. 1922); Chicago City Ry. v. Matthieson, 72 N.E. 443, 444-45 (Ill. 1904); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 49-59 (citing cases). Much of the case law recognized this as the "general rule." Return to text.

[67] 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 259. Return to text.

[68] See, e.g., Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950); Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 25, 28 (1876); Thompson v. State, 58 N.E.2d 112, 112-13 (Ind. 1944), overruled by Dean v. State, 433 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. 1982); American Stores Co. v. Herman, 171 A. 54, 55-56 (Md. 1934); Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 226-27 (Md. 1912); People v. Purman, 185 N.W. 725, 727 (Mich. 1921); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 74-76 (1871); Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo. 1967); Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 226 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Mo. 1950); Reeves v. Hill, 158 S.E.2d 529, 537 (N.C. 1968); Hale v. Smith, 460 P.2d 351, 353 (Or. 1969); State v. Turner, 15 S.E. 602, 602-03 (S.C. 1892); Kepley v. State, 320 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1957); Russell v. Cavelero, 246 P. 25, 26 (Wash. 1926); see also Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1971); Sweazey v. Valley Transp., Inc., 107 P.2d 567, 572 (Wash. 1940) (describing admitting prior consistent statements to rebut prior inconsistent statements as the minority rule); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 59-65 (citing cases); see generally 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 258-67. Return to text.

[69] 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 259. Return to text.

[70] See, e.g., United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 733-35 (2d Cir. 1968); Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 834 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1960); Cafasso v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7 ("[I]f some portions of a statement made by a witness are used on cross-examination to impeach him, other portions of the statement which are relevant to the subject matter about which he was cross-examined may be introduced in evidence to meet the force of the impeachment."); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp. 435, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1949); see generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6712, at 461 (interim ed. 1992). Return to text.

[71] See, e.g., Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1970); Twardosky v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 A.2d 723, 727 (N.H. 1948); Sweazey, 107 P.2d at 572; see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 260-65; GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6712, at 461; Graham, supra note 1, at 594-602. Return to text.

[72] See, e.g., Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1968); National Postal Transp. Assoc. v. Hudson, 216 F.2d 193, 200 (8th Cir. 1954); Cafasso, 169 F.2d at 453; Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7; State v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124, 133-34 (R.I. 1972). Return to text.

[73] FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (1938) (amended 1972). Return to text.

[74] See id. Rule 43(a) provided, in pertinent part:

All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs . . . .
Id.; see also generally Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. REV. 560 (1952). Return to text.

[75] See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (1946). Rule 26 provided, in pertinent part: "The admissibility of evidence . . . shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. Return to text.

[76] FED. R. EVID. 102. Return to text.

[77] See William L. Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32 FED. B.J. 225, 228-29 (1973). Return to text.

[78] See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 36, § 5005, at 90. Return to text.

[79] See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note (comparing Rule 63(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence with Rule 801(d)). Return to text.

[80] See id. Return to text.

[81] FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Rule 801(a) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a). Rule 801(b) defines a "declarant" as "a person who makes a statement." FED. R. EVID. 801(b). Return to text.

[82] See FED. R. EVID. 802. Rule 802 provides that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Id. Return to text.

[83] FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). Of course, prior consistent statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) must still qualify for admission under the relevancy rules. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03. Return to text.

[84] This is true for all prior statements admitted under Rule 801(d). See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note. Return to text.

[85] Id. Return to text.

[86] See, e.g., Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1449 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Roy, 843 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 867 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1004 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, without discussion, that trial court's admission of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate witnesses was not an abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (arguing that the limitations on the use of prior consistent statements apply only to affirmative evidence), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 50 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting but not deciding the issue). Return to text.

[87] See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 251, at 117; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 36, § 6712, at 461-63; Graham, supra note 1, at 594-604. Return to text.

[88] See, e.g., Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 730; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 399; Rubin, 609 F.2d at 66-70 (Friendly, J., concurring); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978); see also White, 11 F.3d at 1449; Bolick, 917 F.2d at 138; Bowman, 798 F.2d at 338. Return to text.

[89] See cases cited supra note 88. Return to text.

[90] See, e.g., Quinto, 582 F.2d at 233. Return to text.

[91] See, e.g., Andrade, 788 F.2d at 533; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; see also John D. Bennett, Note, Prior Consistent Statements and Motives to Lie, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1987). Rule 106 provides: "When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." FED. R. EVID. 106. Courts have recognized that this is "not a precise use of Rule 106." E.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333. Return to text.

[92] See, e.g., Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 729; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333. Return to text.

[93] United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1991); Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 759 (1987). Return to text.

[94] Miller, 874 F.2d at 1273 (emphasis added). Return to text.

[95] Id. (emphasis omitted). Return to text.

[96] Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit quoted a treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence:

[T]he drafters believed (i) that the principles governing rehabilitation would remain unchanged by the Rules, (ii) that the rather specific description of circumstances of admissibility contained in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) reaches all cases in which prior consistent statements may be received to repair credibility, and consequently (iii) that this Rule permits the substantive use of every prior statement which may be received to rehabilitate a witness.
Id. at 1273 n.11 (quoting 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 420, at 195 (1980)). Return to text.

[97] See, e.g., Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 246. Professor Ohlbaum reasons that:

[T]he term "recent" . . . purposefully introduces the crucial element of the time frame during which the alleged motive to lie emerged. If improper influence or motive is the basis for the intentionally fabricated testimony, "recent" fabrication requires that the motive occur after the consistent statement was made. Thus, the phrase "recent fabrication" introduces two elements: first, with regard to "fabrication," an intentional or purposeful falsification; second, with respect to "recent," a falsification which results from a motive that developed after the statement was made.
Id. at 246-47. Return to text.

[98] See, e.g., Graham, supra note 1, at 583. Return to text.

[99] FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note. Return to text.

[100] FIRST CIRCUIT: First Circuit case law discussing this issue is sparse. Only one First Circuit case, United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1988), examines the issue. The Vest court determined that the prior consistent statements at issue "were made before [the declarant] acquired a motive to fabricate," and thus were admissible. Id. at 1330. Other prior consistent statements were made after the declarant acquired a motive to fabricate. See id. The court reasoned that these statements were "not hearsay at all" because they "were not 'offered . . . to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' " Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c)). Thus, these postmotive statements were "not 'prior consistent statements' under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)." Id. The First Circuit noted the split in the circuits on this issue without further elaboration in United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 759 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989).

SECOND CIRCUIT: See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding prior consistent statement admissible for rehabilitation purposes even if inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (arguing that standards of admissibility announced in United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978), should not apply when prior consistent statements are introduced for purely rehabilitative purposes), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); Quinto, 582 F.2d at 234 (litigant seeking to introduce prior consistent statement "must demonstrate that the . . . statement was made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose"); see also United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1994) (examining the "Pierre exception" for rehabilitative purposes); United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Quinto requirements were satisfied in this case."); see also generally Yvette Olstein, Comment, Pierre and Brennan: The Rehabilitation of Prior Consistent Statements, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 515 (1987) (discussing Pierre, Brennan, Quinto, Rubin, and the law of prior consistent statements in the Second Circuit).

THIRD CIRCUIT: See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (whether to admit postmotive prior consistent statement is a relevancy matter; when statement is made postmotive, the statement is not relevant to rebut an implication of recent fabrication, and is therefore inadmissible for substantive purposes; however, postmotive statements offered only for rehabilitative purposes may be admissible); see also United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting, but not reaching, the issue).

FOURTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[A] prior consistent statement is admissible under the rule only if the statement was made prior to the time the supposed motive to falsify arose."); see also United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1990). The Bolick court "assume[d], without deciding, that the prior consistent statements were admitted as rehabilitation and that they are not subject to the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." Id. The court further noted that the Fourth Circuit "may have endorsed" the proposition that postmotive prior consistent statements are admissible for nonsubstantive purposes in United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1983). Bolick, 917 F.2d at 138 (citing Parodi, 703 F.2d at 785-86 (citing in turn Rubin, 609 F.2d at 66-70 (Friendly, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Mehra, 824 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding without elaboration in face of defendant's postmotive rule argument that "[a]dmission of the statement, even if erroneous, presents no grounds for reversal") (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1979) (allowing prior consistent statement for rehabilitation of impeached witness); United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (assuming that the prior consistent statement was not made before the motive to fabricate existed).

SEVENTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that in order to admit prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), "the witness must . . . have made the statements before he had a motive to fabricate") (citing United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Davis, 890 F.2d 1373, 1379 (7th Cir. 1989) (to admit prior consistent statements as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), "the statement must have been made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate") (quoting United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[The postmotive] condition need not be met to admit into evidence prior consistent statements which are offered solely to rehabilitate a witness rather than as evidence of the matters asserted in those statements."); see also Thomas v. United States, 41 F.3d 1109, 1119 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[The defendant did] not argue that he offered his prior consistent statement merely to rehabilitate his testimony on the stand, that is, not as substantive evidence. Therefore, [the court did] not address whether Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) would encompass the admissibility of his prior statement offered for that purpose."); United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1391 (7th Cir. 1992) (setting forth four criteria, including the premotive rule, that must be met in order to admit a prior consistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)).

EIGHTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]o be admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement must have been made before the motive to fabricate came into existence.") (citing United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Bowman court had stated that "the better rule imposes a requirement that the consistent statements must come before the motive to fabricate existed"; however, the court noted, no prejudicial error was shown. Bowman, 798 F.2d at 338; see also United States v. Roy, 843 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Bowman specifically held that prior consistent statements made after the existence of a motive to fabricate are admissible for rehabilitation . . . .") (citing Bowman, 798 F.2d at 338); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing F.B.I. agent's statements to "rehabilitate and support" agent following implied charge of fabrication). The Andrade court also noted that the Quinto holding was being questioned by the Second Circuit and cited Judge Friendly's concurrence in Rubin. See id.; see also United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that the facts did not support defendant's argument that prior consistent statements were inadmissible because they were postmotive). Return to text.

[101] See, e.g., Patterson, 23 F.3d at 1247; Casoni, 950 F.2d at 904; Harris, 761 F.2d at 399; Quinto, 582 F.2d at 233-34. Return to text.

[102] See, e.g., Harris, 761 F.2d at 399; Quinto, 582 F.2d at 234-35. Return to text.

[103] United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-100 (1977)); see also White, 11 F.3d at 1450 (quoting same). Return to text.

[104] See, e.g., Casoni, 950 F.2d at 904-05; Harris, 761 F.2d at 399 (citing FED. R. EVID. 402). Return to text.

[105] See, e.g., Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; United States v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113, 1114 (7th Cir. 1977). Return to text.

[106] See, e.g., United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 785 (4th Cir. 1983). Return to text.

[107] See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986); Harris, 761 F.2d at 400. Return to text.

[108] See, e.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; see also GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6712, at 461-63. Return to text.

[109] See, e.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1215, 1252 (7th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 533 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]his rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements is in accord with the principle of completeness prompted by Rule 106."); supra note 86 and accompanying text. But see Ohlbaum, supra note 97, at 282 & n.140 ("[T]hese courts have relied on a tortured reading of the 'rule of completeness' . . . ."). Courts, too, have noted that this is "not a precise use of Rule 106." E.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333. Return to text.

[110] FIFTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 295-96 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (postmotive prior consistent statement admissible for substantive purposes); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 289 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (postmotive prior consistent statement admissible for substantive purposes) (citing United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also United States v. Cifarelli, 589 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting, but not examining, the issue).

SIXTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[W]here there are other indicia of reliability surrounding a prior consistent statement that make it relevant to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, then the fact that the statement was made after the alleged motive to falsify should not preclude its admissibility."); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting the Sixth Circuit's "desire for a more relaxed standard of admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and [the court's] uneasiness with the Quinto decision") (citing United States v. LeBlanc, 612 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1980)).

NINTH CIRCUIT: The Ninth Circuit has a somewhat convoluted history on this issue. Recent case law indicates, however, that the Ninth Circuit fits into this category. Cf. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-196 to -198 (putting Ninth Circuit in premotive requirement category). In United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit stated that the premotive "requirement should not be applied as a rigid per se rule barring all such prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), without regard to other surrounding circumstances that may give them significant probative value." Id. at 1274. The Miller court reasoned that "a prior consistent statement offered for rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible at all." Id. at 1273. The Miller court also found this conclusion "consistent with the case law of this circuit." Id. at 1273 n.13; see also United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1470-72 (9th Cir. 1991) (following Miller); cf. Breneman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1986) ("A prior consistent statement is admissible only if it was made before the witness had a motive to fabricate.") (citing United States v. De Coito, 764 F.2d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A prior consistent statement is admissible to rehabilitate a witness only if made before the witness has a motive to fabricate.").

TENTH CIRCUIT: United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he pre-motive rule is clearly too broad."), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995). For a discussion of the Tome case, see infra Part IV.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: See United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[The] argument that . . . prior consistent statements [are] inadmissible because they were not made before the motive to fabricate arose has repeatedly been rejected by this circuit."); United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942 n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (following Williams, 573 F.2d at 289 n.3, and Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1135).

D.C. CIRCUIT: See United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[The] prior consistent statement need not have preceded the appearance of the motive in order to render the statement non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)."). Return to text.

[111] See, e.g., Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098; Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1273. Return to text.

[112] See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182; Williams, 574 F.2d at 289 n.3 (following Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1135). Return to text.

[113] See, e.g., Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098. Return to text.

[114] See, e.g., Tome, 3 F.3d at 350; Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098; Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182-83. Return to text.

[115] See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182-83. Return to text.

[116] 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989). Return to text.

[117] See id. at 1272-74. Return to text.

[118] Id. at 1272 (citation omitted). The court based this conclusion on its reasoning that "[because] the requirement of no prior motive to fabricate is rooted in Rules 402 and 403, and not in the terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is no basis for limiting the requirement to cases involving prior statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." Id. Return to text.

[119] Id. at 1273 (footnote omitted). For a further discussion of Miller, see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[120] See Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274. Return to text.

[121] 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995). Return to text.

[122] Id. at 699. Return to text.

[123] Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg in all but Part II.B, which Justice Scalia did not join. See id. at 699. Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas. See id. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. See id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Return to text.

[124] See id. at 705. Return to text.

[125] Id. at 700 (emphasis added) (citing Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836) ("[W]here the testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date . . . in order to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of the party may be admitted.")); see also People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 712 (N.Y. 1949). The majority also cited the treatises of Professor McCormick and Dean Wigmore. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 49, at 105 (2d ed. 1972); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1128, at 268). Return to text.

[126] See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 701-02. Return to text.

[127] See id. at 701. Return to text.

[128] Id. The majority noted that the Advisory Committee used "the same phrase . . . in its description of the 'traditiona[l]' common law of evidence." Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note). Return to text.

[129] Id. The majority rephrased this reasoning: "the forms of impeachment within the Rule's coverage are the ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most sense." Id. Return to text.

[130] See id. ("A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive."). Return to text.

[131] See id. ("[P]rior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved.") (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 49, at 105 (2d ed. 1972); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1131, at 293). Return to text.

[132] See id. ("[O]ut-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication . . . refute the charged fabrication in a less direct and forceful way."). Return to text.

[133] Id. at 702. Return to text.

[134] Recall that prior consistent statements have very high rebuttal force when used to rebut impeachment by charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[135] See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702 (explaining that if there is no temporal requirement "imbedded in" Rule 801(d)(1)(B), then there is "no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well"). Return to text.

[136] Id. Return to text.

[137] See id. The majority suggested that a rule that provides that "a witness' prior consistent statements are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness's truthfulness or accuracy" would embody the Government's theory. Id. Return to text.

[138] Id. at 702 (citing Ohlbaum, supra note 97, at 245 ("Rule 801(d)(1)(B) employs the precise language—'rebut[ting] . . . charge[s] . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive'—consistently used in the panoply of pre-1975 decisions.")); see also Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1968); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949). Return to text.

[139] Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702. Return to text.

[140] Id. at 704 ("This argument misconceives the design of the Rules' hearsay provisions."). Return to text.

[141] Id. Return to text.

[142] See id. at 705. Return to text.

[143] Id. The majority noted that postmotive prior consistent statements could gain admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) if the statements met Rule 803(24)'s requirements. See id. Rule 803(24) is known as the "catch-all exception." See generally GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6775; see also infra note 205. Return to text.

[144] Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702. Justice Scalia did not join in Part II.B of the Court's opinion because the majority's discussion "gives effect to those Notes" as displaying "the 'purpose' or 'inten[t]' of the draftsmen." Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). Return to text.

[145] Id. at 702 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165-66 n.9 (1988)). Return to text.

[146] Id. Return to text.

[147] Id. at 702-03. Return to text.

[148] Id. at 703. Return to text.

[149] Id. at 704. Return to text.

[150] Id. at 703-04 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note). Return to text.

[151] See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[152] See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700. Return to text.

[153] See id. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[154] Id. The dissent noted that the treatises discuss the issue "under the general heading of 'impeachment and support' (McCormick) or 'relevancy' (Wigmore), and not 'hearsay.' " Id. at 706-07. Return to text.

[155] Id. at 707. Return to text.

[156] Id. Return to text.

[157] See id. " '[I]f the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support.' " Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 49, at 105 n.88 (2d ed. 1972)) (alteration in original). Return to text.

[158] See id. Return to text.

[159] See id. Return to text.

[160] See id. Return to text.

[161] Id. Return to text.

[162] See id. The majority's "no sound reason" analysis is described supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[163] Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 707 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-188 ("[A]s a practical matter, the jury in all probability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction [with respect to the class of prior consistent statements covered by the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for giving one.")). Return to text.

[164] See id. at 707-08. Return to text.

[165] See id. Return to text.

[166] See id. at 707-08. Return to text.

[167] Id. at 708 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note). Return to text.

[168] Id. at 708. Return to text.

[169] Id. at 709. Return to text.

[170] See id. at 709-10. Return to text.

[171] Id. at 708. Return to text.

[172] Id. Return to text.

[173] See id. (citing United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1972); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324, 328 (1848)). Return to text.

[174] See id. Return to text.

[175] See id. at 709. Return to text.

[176] Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). Return to text.

[177] Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (finding the Frye test "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules")). Return to text.

[178] Id. Return to text.

[179] Id. at 709-10. Return to text.

[180] See id. at 710. Return to text.

[181] See, e.g., Graham, supra note 1; Ohlbaum, supra note 97. Return to text.

[182] See 115 S. Ct. at 702. Return to text.

[183] See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[184] See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[185] See, e.g., United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1972); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). Return to text.

[186] See 115 S. Ct. at 702. Return to text.

[187] See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[188] See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that prior consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence or not at all. See supra notes 93-95, 110, 116-20 and accompanying text. However, the Ninth Circuit allowed postmotive prior consistent statements for substantive use in certain situations. See United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989). Return to text.

[189] 115 S. Ct. at 708 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[190] Id. Return to text.

[191] See id. Return to text.

[192] See supra Part II. Return to text.

[193] See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[194] United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); see supra note 43 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[195] 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983). Return to text.

[196] See id. at 138. Return to text.

[197] See id. Return to text.

[198] Id. at 139. Return to text.

[199] Id. (citations omitted). Return to text.

[200] See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[201] Respondent's Brief at 45 n.24, Tome (No. 93-6892). Return to text.

[202] 115 S. Ct. at 705. Return to text.

[203] See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[204] See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[205] Rule 803(24) provides that:

A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 803(24). Return to text.

[206] See 115 S. Ct. at 705; see also United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 340-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976); Arizona v. Huerta, 826 P.2d 1210, 1212-14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Arizona v. Thompson, 805 P.2d 1051, 1053-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); see generally Arthur H. Travers, Jr., Prior Consistent Statements, 57 NEB. L. REV. 974, 998-1002 (1978). Return to text.

[207] See generally GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6775. Return to text.

[208] See id. § 6775, at 744-47. Rule 803(24)'s other requirements are similarly unnecessary and overburdensome in this situation. Return to text.

[209] 41 L.R.A. (N.S.), supra note 1, at 858. Return to text.