[*] The author thanks Professor Jean R. Sternlight and Florida Dispute Resolution Center Director Sharon Press for their assistance in reviewing this Comment. Return to text.

[1] This Comment uses the term "arbitration" to refer to this variety of dispute resolution. Court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration is distinguishable from voluntary, binding arbitration. Binding arbitration is typically a contractual obligation through which parties place the final disposition of their dispute in the hands of an arbitrator or arbitration panel. See FLA. STAT. 44.104 (1995) (permitting parties in a civil action to submit their dispute to a court-appointed arbitrator). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the validity of binding arbitration agreements in order to advance new forms of dispute resolution. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 322-26 (1985). Nonbinding arbitration leaves the option of court action open by allowing the parties to appeal an arbitration decision through a motion for a trial de novo. See FLA. STAT. 44.103(5) (1995). Return to text.

[2] See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Return to text.

[3] See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 44.103(6) (1995) (allowing the assessment of arbitration costs, court costs, and attorney's fees when the trial outcome is not more favorable than the arbitration). Return to text.

[4] See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ."). Return to text.

[5] See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1899). Return to text.

[6] See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990); see also generally Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 503 (1989). As with many rights, the right to a jury trial can be waived. See Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 21. An argument claiming denial of this right after it has been waived is moot. Return to text.

[7] See Terry, 494 U.S. at 564-65 (holding that a jury trial is required for an action brought under the National Labor Relations Act). Return to text.

[8] See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1874); see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) ("The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Golann, supra note 6, at 503. Return to text.

[9] See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, 22. The authors of one treatise found that 48 states provide for jury trials in their constitutions. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 17.8 n.12 (1986). Return to text.

[10] 174 U.S. 1 (1899). Return to text.

[11] See id. at 3. Return to text.

[12] See id. at 4. Return to text.

[13] See id. at 3-4. Return to text.

[14] See id. at 7-8. The Seventh Amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Return to text.

[15] See id. at 45. Return to text.

[16] See id. Return to text.

[17] See id. at 38. Return to text.

[18] See id. at 38-39. Return to text.

[19] See, e.g., In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955). Return to text.

[20] See generally Golann, supra note 6, at 505. Return to text.

[21] See id. Return to text.

[22] It should be noted, however, that considerable delays are also imposed upon trial participants in the form of a mandatory discovery process. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Return to text.

[23] 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955). Return to text.

[24] See id. at 629-31 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, 6). Return to text.

[25] See id. Return to text.

[26] See id. Return to text.

[27] See id. Return to text.

[28] 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977). Return to text.

[29] See id. at 747 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, 23). Return to text.

[30] See id. at 748. Return to text.

[31] See id. Return to text.

[32] See id. at 748-49. Return to text.

[33] See id. at 749; cf. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915) (holding that the introduction of an Interstate Commerce Commission report did not abridge the right to trial by jury). But see Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 907-09 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (holding that the introduction of an arbitration panel report violated the right to trial by jury). Return to text.

[34] 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989). Return to text.

[35] See id. at 1095-96. Return to text.

[36] See id. at 1096. Return to text.

[37] See id. at 1097. Return to text.

[38] See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."); id. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."). Return to text.

[39] See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Return to text.

[40] Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 (citations omitted). Return to text.

[41] Traditional aspects of due process include formal testimony and the right to cross-examine witnesses. See Golann, supra note 6, at 540 n.238; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970) (holding that a pre-termination hearing is necessary to provide due process to welfare recipients who are losing their benefits). However, the Supreme Court has held that less formal procedures may be sufficient to protect due process. See Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (upholding use of mandatory binding arbitration to resolve amount of loss in fire insurance claim). Return to text.

[42] See Golann, supra note 6, at 540. Return to text.

[43] 447 U.S. 667 (1980). Return to text.

[44] See id. at 669. Return to text.

[45] See id. at 673. Return to text.

[46] See id. at 680-81. Return to text.

[47] See id. at 683-84. Return to text.

[48] See id. at 680-81. Return to text.

[49] 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Return to text.

[50] See id. at 437. Return to text.

[51] See id. at 426. Return to text.

[52] See id. at 427. Return to text.

[53] See id. (citing Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 411 N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (Ill. 1980)). Return to text.

[54] See id. at 433-34; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (finding that a university professor's interest in renewing his employment contract was not sufficient to be protected by the Due Process Clause). Return to text.

[55] See Logan, 455 U.S. at 434. Return to text.

[56] See id. at 434-35; cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (holding that inadvertent withholding of property did not deny due process when state tort law provided an adequate remedy), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Return to text.

[57] See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976); Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 394 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978). Return to text.

[58] See Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805 (citing FLA. STAT. 768.133 (1975)); Parker, 394 A.2d at 935-36 (citing PA. CONS. STAT. 1301.101 (Supp. 1977)). Return to text.

[59] See Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805; Parker, 394 A.2d at 936. Return to text.

[60] See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980). Return to text.

[61] Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 238. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the lengthy delays caused by the arbitration system. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 195. Return to text.

[62] See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 194. Return to text.

[63] See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236-37. Among the reasons cited for the delays were the death of a mediation panel member, clerical mistakes, and failure to select a panel in time. See id. Return to text.

[64] See id. at 237-38; Mattos, 421 A.2d at 192. Return to text.

[65] See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 238; Mattos, 421 A.2d at 196. Return to text.

[66] See supra text accompanying note 27. Return to text.

[67] See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 237 ("While we originally upheld the facial validity of the medical mediation act . . . the practical operation and effect of the statute has rendered it unconstitutional."); Mattos, 421 A.2d at 190 ("[W]e . . . must regrettably conclude that the lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system . . . does in fact burden the right of a jury trial.").

Other grounds for due process challenges have included the admission of arbitration decisions as evidence in subsequent proceedings and bond requirements for appeals. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that an arbitration panel's finding constitutes an expert opinion that is rebuttable through introduction of competent evidence, but that the $2000 bond required for appeal denied access to Arizona's courts). The arguments surrounding these challenges do not shed light on the other arguments made on due process grounds and are not given in-depth treatment in this Comment. Return to text.

[68] See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3.5, at 129 (5th ed. 1995). Return to text.

[69] See id. Return to text.

[70] See U.S. CONST. art. III, 1. ("The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."). Return to text.

[71] See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 1989) (separation of powers challenge made under the Colorado Constitution). Return to text.

[72] See Golann, supra note 6, at 523 (discussing the possible pressures that can be used to induce mediators and arbitrators to resolve cases quickly). Return to text.

[73] 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Return to text.

[74] See id. at 67-72, 76. Bankruptcy is a public right, which is a "matter[ ] arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority.' " Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). "In contrast, 'the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,' is a matter of private rights." Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50). The litigation of public rights requires neither a jury trial nor an Article III judge, whereas the litigation of private rights requires both. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989). Return to text.

[75] See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77-81. Return to text.

[76] See id. at 77. Adjuncts generally handle certain fact-finding functions to assist the federal courts. See id. Return to text.

[77] See id. at 77-87 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54 (holding that the use of administrative agencies to determine issues of fact was constitutional because the sole power to enforce the findings was with the district courts); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980) (holding that the use of magistrates to determine certain pretrial motions did not violate Article III because the process was under the complete control of the judiciary)). Return to text.

[78] See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 44.103(5) (1995). Return to text.

[79] See id. Return to text.

[80] The Florida Constitution contains such a clause. See FLA. CONST. art. II, 3 ("The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."). Return to text.

[81] 776 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 1989). Return to text.

[82] See id. at 1094; see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (Ariz. 1977). But see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ill. 1976) (holding that allowing nonjudicial members of medical review panels to exercise judicial functions violated Illinois' separation of powers doctrine). Return to text.

[83] See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal Protection of the laws."). Return to text.

[84] See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-29 (1996) (holding that Colorado's state constitutional amendment prohibiting governmental action to protect homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 467-69 (1957) (holding that the creation of a closed class receiving differential treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause). Return to text.

[85] See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Return to text.

[86] See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); see also Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29. Return to text.

[87] See Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989); Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 747 (Ariz. 1977). Return to text.

[88] See 776 P.2d at 1092-93. In Florida, courts are permitted to send almost any type of dispute to nonbinding arbitration, regardless of the amount in controversy. See FLA. STAT. 44.103(2) (1995); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.700(a), 1.800 (establishing that courts can refer any case or portion thereof to arbitration except bond estreatures, habeas corpus or other extraordinary writs, bond validations, civil or criminal contempt, and other matters specified by the chief judge). Return to text.

[89] See 570 P.2d at 750-51. Return to text.

[90] See Eastin, 570 P.2d at 751; Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098. Return to text.

[91] See Eastin, 570 P.2d at 750-51; Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098-99; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that imperfect classifications do not offend equal protection if the classification has some reasonable basis); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (holding that the safeguard of equal protection is offended when the state creates a classification that bears no rational relation to the object of the legislation). But see Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 906-07 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (holding that compulsory arbitration discriminates against medical malpractice claimants). Return to text.

[92] See Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098-99. Return to text.

[93] See id. at 1099 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. 1332 (West Supp. 1989)). Return to text.

[94] See id. at 1099. The program scrutinized by the court was a pilot program used in only a few district courts across Colorado. See id. at 1098. Return to text.

[95] See 570 P.2d at 751. Return to text.

[96] See id. Return to text.

[97] See id. Return to text.

[98] See id. Return to text.

[99] Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 836-37 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (holding that rules requiring listing of collateral benefits in complaint and deducting certain collateral benefits from medical claim awards violated the Equal Protection Clause). Return to text.

[100] See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1988). Return to text.

[101] 486 U.S. 71 (1988). Return to text.

[102] See id. at 85. Return to text.

[103] See id. at 75. Return to text.

[104] See id. at 80-81. Return to text.

[105] See id. at 81-82 (citing Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268, 274-75 (Miss. 1983)). Return to text.

[106] See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."). Return to text.

[107] See Golann, supra note 6, at 547 ("[F]ederal access claims are usually analyzed under due process principles."); see generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (holding that state due process clauses require that parties not be denied divorce by high filing fee). Return to text.

[108] 610 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1992). Return to text.

[109] See id. at 423-24 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, 21). Return to text.

[110] See id. at 424; see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that a $2000 appeal bond placed too heavy a burden on access to court). Florida does not require a bond when appealing a nonbinding arbitration decision. See FLA. STAT. 44.103 (1995) (setting out the procedures and costs for arbitration and trials de novo). Return to text.

[111] 118 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. 1954). Return to text.

[112] See id. at 267-68. Return to text.

[113] See id. at 266-67. Return to text.

[114] See id. at 267; cf. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 496-97 (1927) (holding that companies allowed to conduct business in a state are not required to accept unconstitutional conditions in order to continue doing business). Return to text.

[115] See People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 137 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1956). Return to text.

[116] See 776 P.2d at 1096. Return to text.

[117] Id. at 1096. Return to text.