[*] The author thanks his wife, Sonya, for her unselfish support during the last three years. Return to text.

[1] Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957). Return to text.

[2] Oversight into the Administration of State and Local Court Adjudication of Driving While Intoxicated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 93 (1982) (statement of Dr. Alastair Conn, Medical Director, Field Operations Program, Maryland Inst. for Emergency Med. Sys.) [hereinafter Conn Statement]. Return to text.

[3] See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, at 184 (1996); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 582 n.133 (1991) (stating that the average age of servicemen killed in Vietnam was 19). Return to text.

[4] See Conn Statement, supra note 2, at 93. Return to text.

[5] See William J. Ostrowski, Drunk Driving and Chemical Tests—A Labyrinthine Maze, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 22 (1991). Return to text.

[6] See Mark Feigl, Note, DWI and the Insanity Defense: A Reasoned Approach, 20 VT. L. REV. 161, 166 (1995). Return to text.

[7] See State v. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 1990) (finding that evidence of a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.10% is prima facie evidence the defendant was under the influence to the extent his normal faculties were impaired). Return to text.

[8] See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (finding sobriety checkpoint law constitutional). Return to text.

[9] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616 (Supp. 1996); see also Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-272, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091, 1100. Return to text.

[10] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[11] See, e.g., Mark L. Weber, Note, Reyes v. Kuboyama: Vendor Liability for the Sale of Intoxicating Liquor to Minors Under a Common Law Negligence Theory, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 355, 355 (1995) (citing statistics showing that the alcohol-related fatal accident rate for 18- to 20-year-olds was twice as high per capita as the rate for those over age 21). Return to text.

[12] See Michael Philip Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 658 (1988) (citing statistics from a 1984 study conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration). Return to text.

[13] See id. Return to text.

[14] See Exec. Order No. 12,358, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,311 (1982). Return to text.

[15] See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 658. Return to text.

[16] See Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, §§ 6-7, 98 Stat. 435, 437-39 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)). Return to text.

[17] See id. Return to text.

[18] See South Dakota v. Dole, 423 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). Return to text.

[19] Pub. L. No. 104-59, 109 Stat. 568 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1996)). Return to text.

[20] See id. § 320, 109 Stat at 589 (codified at 23 U.S.C.A. § 161(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996)). Return to text.

[21] See 23 U.S.C.A. § 161(a) (West Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[22] See id. § 161(a)(1). Return to text.

[23] See id. § 161(a)(2). Return to text.

[24] See Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-272, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091, 1091-96 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 322.2616 (Supp. 1996)). Return to text.

[25] See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for HB 455 (1996) Staff Analysis 6 (final July 1, 1996) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Staff Analysis]. Return to text.

[26] See Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driver Menace: Conditioning the Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint Seizures—The Constitutionality of a Model Consent Seizure Statute, 59 ALB. L. REV. 599, 610 (1995). Return to text.

[27] See Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 2. Return to text.

[28] See Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-272, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091; see also Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 6. Return to text.

[29] See ch. 96-272, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 1100. Return to text.

[30] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[31] See id. Return to text.

[32] See id. § 322.2616(1)(b). Return to text.

[33] See id. § 322.2616(17); see also id. § 316.1932. Return to text.

[34] See id. § 322.2616(2). Return to text.

[35] See id. Return to text.

[36] See id. Return to text.

[37] See id. Return to text.

[38] See id. § 322.2616(5). Return to text.

[39] See id. § 322.2616(5), (7)(b). Return to text.

[40] See id. § 322.2616(6). Return to text.

[41] See id. § 322.2616(17). Return to text.

[42] See id. § 322.2616(7)(b). Return to text.

[43] See id. § 322.2616(8). Return to text.

[44] See id. § 322.2616(8)(a). Return to text.

[45] See id. § 322.2616(8)(b). Return to text.

[46] See id. § 322.2616(14). Return to text.

[47] See id. § 322.2616(16). Return to text.

[48] See id. § 322.2616(18). Return to text.

[49] See id. Return to text.

[50] See id. Return to text.

[51] See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying an individual the equal protection of the laws, see id., and thus mandates that states treat similarly situated persons similarly and not classify them based on impermissible criteria, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2, at 587 (5th ed. 1995), the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld age-based classifications when they possess a rational basis, see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976). Moreover, the Court also has specifically upheld laws regulating the rights and liberties of persons under the age of 18 as possessing a rational basis as long as the classification did not impinge upon a fundamental right. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993) (finding that minors do not have fundamental right to be in noncustodial setting). Driving is not considered a fundamental right. See, e.g., Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (Fla. 1993).

Nevertheless, although age classifications are not prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, states may protect age groups through their own constitutions or legislation. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1995). The Louisiana Constitution specifies age as a protected category in its equal protection clause. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld drinking restrictions based on age using a heightened intermediate level of scrutiny. See Manuel v. State, 677 So. 2d 116, 125 (La. 1996). In 1973, the Florida Legislature passed a law stating that individuals over the age of 18 "shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges, and obligations of all persons 21 years of age or older." Act effective July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, §§ 2-3, 1973 Fla. Laws 59, 59 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1995)). The only exceptions to the law are those rights that are excluded under the Florida Constitution and the state Beverage Law. See FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1995). Although the administrative driver's license suspension statute would seem to be in conflict with this law, the Florida Supreme Court would likely uphold the statute using basic principles of statutory construction:

[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms. The more specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more comprehensive statute. . . .
Further, when two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent. McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, to ensure that such a conflict does not arise, the Legislature should amend section 743.07, Florida Statutes, to include a specific exception for the new statute, just as it did after passing the state Beverage Law. See Act Effective Oct. 1, 1980, ch. 80-74, § 5, 1980 Fla. Laws 254, 256 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1) (1995)). Return to text.

[52] See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 51, § 13.1, at 511. Return to text.

[53] FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. Return to text.

[54] See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Return to text.

[55] See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Return to text.

[56] See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (finding restrictions on the fundamental right to marry should be subject to strict scrutiny); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (finding the right not to be placed in a custodial institution nonfundamental and thus subject to rational relationship scrutiny). Return to text.

[57] See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. Return to text.

[58] See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-03. Return to text.

[59] See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (1993). Return to text.

[60] See id. at 1060. Return to text.

[61] See id. at 1061. Return to text.

[62] 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Return to text.

[63] See id. at 335. Return to text.

[64] See id. Return to text.

[65] See id. at 332. Return to text.

[66] Id. Return to text.

[67] Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Return to text.

[68] See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1970). Return to text.

[69] See id. Return to text.

[70] 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Return to text.

[71] Id. at 539. Return to text.

[72] See id. Return to text.

[73] See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (Fla. 1993) ("[D]riving is not a fundamental right."); see also Bell, 402 U.S. at 539 ("Suspension of issued licenses . . . adjudicates important interests of the licensees."). Return to text.

[74] See 402 U.S. at 542. Return to text.

[75] 431 U.S. 105 (1977). Return to text.

[76] See id. at 115 Return to text.

[77] See id. Return to text.

[78] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 1996) ("The driver may request a formal or informal review of the suspension . . . ."). Return to text.

[79] See id. § 322.2616(2)(a) (allowing a law enforcement officer on the scene to suspend the license on behalf of DMV). Return to text.

[80] See 431 U.S. at 106. Return to text.

[81] Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Return to text.

[82] Id. at 343. Return to text.

[83] Although officer fabrication could also lead to erroneous deprivation, this Comment does not address that issue. See Samborn v. State, 666 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding that civilian breath-testing technicians routinely destroyed test-result "print-cards" showing that the testing device may have been out of tolerance and operating in error). Return to text.

[84] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(1)(b) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[85] See id. Return to text.

[86] See id. § 322.2616(17). Return to text.

[87] See id. § 322.2616(2)(a). Return to text.

[88] See Myles A. Kauffman, The Coming of Subsection (a)(5) of Pennsylvania's Drunk Driving Law: "A Statute with a Face Only a Prosecutor Could Love," 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 493, 505 (1995). Return to text.

[89] See Robert J. DeLucia, Drug and Alcohol Testing Issues in the Airline and Railroad Industries, SA31 A.L.I.- A.B.A. 765, 779 (1996) (stating questions of calibration of the equipment and skill of the collector are likely to arise at the low threshold of 0.02%). Return to text.

[90] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(1)(b) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[91] See id. § 322.2616(8)(b). Return to text.

[92] See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995) (signs of bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol used as probable cause that defendant was intoxicated). Obviously, none of these signs are present with a 0.00% blood-alcohol level. Some experts maintain that outward signs of intoxication such as slurred speech cannot be detected until an individual's blood-alcohol level reaches 0.15%. See Greg K. Vitali, Note, An In-Depth Analysis of the Development and Ramifications of New Jersey's Social Host Liability Statute, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 532, 562 n.82 (1996). Accordingly, the ability to detect outward manifestations of intoxication increases as blood-alcohol levels increase. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[93] See, e.g., Andrew J. Schatkin, Criminal Procedure, 1994-95 Survey of New York Law, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 411 (1995) (stating that blood-alcohol level is directly related to breath-alcohol level). Return to text.

[94] See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977). Return to text.

[95] See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(a) (1995). Return to text.

[96] See DeLucia, supra note 89, at 779. Return to text.

[97] See People v. Bergman, 623 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (reporting that Listerine mouthwash and Binaca breath spray give a reading of alcohol on the breathalyzer); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.007(2) (1996) (requiring 20-minute observation before administering a breath test to ensure that the subject does not regurgitate or take anything by mouth). Return to text.

[98] The label for NyQuil cold medicine reports that the alcohol content is 10% by volume. The label for Listerine mouth wash reports that the alcohol content is 21.6% by volume. Return to text.

[99] See Bergman, 623 N.E.2d at 1054. Return to text.

[100] See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.003(7)(a)(2) (1996). Return to text.

[101] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[102] See supra text accompanying note 87. Return to text.

[103] See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) ("At some point the benefit of an additional safe-guard to the individual affected . . . to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."). Return to text.

[104] See Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 133-34 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that due process requires a foundational showing of the reliability of breath measurement devices and that such reliability cannot be presumed). Return to text.

[105] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(17) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). Return to text.

[106] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2615 (1995). Return to text.

[107] But see Coniglio, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128. Under the initial version of California's zero-tolerance law, a breath test was required at a testing facility. See id. However, opponents representing law enforcement associations said such procedures would take too much time to accomplish and would be too costly. See id. The law's final version allowed the use of PAS devices. See id. Return to text.

[108] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2615(1)(a) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[109] See supra text accompanying note 95. Return to text.

[110] See E. John Wherry, Jr., The Rush to Convict DWI Offenders: The Unintended Unconstitutional Consequences, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 429, 446-47 (1994) (stating that mouth alcohol causes inordinately high readings if it has not dissipated and thus officers should not give an immediate breath test). Because preliminary devices are used on the scene, there would not be any time for mouth alcohol to dissipate if the driver had consumed alcohol within the last 20 minutes. Return to text.

[111] See id. at 446 n. 129 (stating that the test will multiply the breath-alcohol level it measures by 2100). Return to text.

[112] See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.007(2) (1996). Return to text.

[113] See id. Return to text.

[114] See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(17) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[115] 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye established the "generally accepted in the scientific community" rule for determining admissibility. See id. at 1014; see also Wherry, supra note 110, at 466. However, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Frye standard was superseded in federal courts by the more flexible standard of whether the evidence is based on scientific knowledge and will assist the jury in understanding or determining a fact in issue. See id. at 587-92. Nonetheless, Florida continues to recognize Frye as the appropriate standard. See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). Return to text.

[116] See Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828. Return to text.

[117] See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23136 (West 1995). Return to text.

[118] See Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 132 (Ct. App. 1995). Return to text.

[119] Id. at 133. Return to text.

[120] See id. Return to text.

[121] It should not cost the state any more to use the machines that are already in use and that are admissible under sections 322.2615 and 316.1932, Florida Statutes. Return to text.

[122] See supra text accompanying note 95. Return to text.

[123] See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Return to text.

[124] See id. Return to text.

[125] See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. Return to text.

[126] See Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1994) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). Return to text.

[127] See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) ("Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goal of punishment."). Return to text.

[128] See Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 1957) (holding the administrative suspension of driver's license did not violate double jeopardy because the primary goal of the statute was to protect the public and not to impose pain or punishment on the offender); Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 223-25 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding no double jeopardy violation); State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533, 533-35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (finding primary purpose of suspension was remedial and not punitive); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (finding suspension was for public protection and not punishment). Return to text.

[129] See Smith, 93 So. 2d at 106-07 (stating that the statute's "primary purpose is to relieve the public generally of the sometimes death-dealing pain" caused by drunk drivers); Davidson, 656 So. 2d at 225 ("[W]e conclude that the administrative remedy of suspending a driver's license . . . continues to be primarily for the purpose of enhancing safe driving on the public highways."); Murray, 644 So. 2d at 535 ("Because the primary purpose of [the statute] is to provide an administrative remedy for public protection, and not to punish the offender, a double jeopardy prohibition does not arise.").

In United States v. Halper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction if the sanction "may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 435 U.S. at 449. However, the Halper decision used the term "remedial" in the sense of reimbursing the government for actual costs attributable to the defendant's conduct, not for actual public protection, as the term is used by Florida courts in suspension of driver's licenses cases. See id. at 449; Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("A driver's license suspension . . . is not remedial in the sense meant by the Halper decision."). Return to text.

[130] See, e.g., Davidson, 656 So. 2d at 223-25. Return to text.

[131] See, e.g., id. Return to text.

[132] See id. at 224. Return to text.

[133] See, e.g., id. Return to text.

[134] See id. at 225. Return to text.

[135] See, e.g., id. Return to text.

[136] See supra text accompanying note 95. Return to text.

[137] See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). Return to text.

[138] See id. § 322.2615. Return to text.

[139] The suspension just cannot be dual. See id. § 322.2616(18). Return to text.

[140] See id. § 316.1934(2)(a). Return to text.

[141] See United States v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 780, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ("[D]ouble jeopardy analysis . . . requires that a court first inquire whether the statute's civil sanctions include sanctions which can be characterized as punishment."). Following a determination that a statute is punitive, courts generally proceed to look at the statute as applied. See id. Return to text.

[142] See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 652. Return to text.

[143] See id. at 652-53. Return to text.

[144] See id. Return to text.

[145] See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. Return to text.

[146] See discussion supra notes 14-17. Return to text.

[147] See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 658 (citing statistics showing that 21-year-olds have a fatal accident rate of 4.08 per one million miles compared to a rate of 3.38 for 20-year-olds); see also Manuel v. State, 677 So. 2d 116, 128 (La. 1996). Return to text.