[*] The author thanks Elizabeth S. Merritt, Associate General Counsel, National Trust for Historic Preservation, for her assistance with the project that lead to this Comment. Special thanks also to Julia H. Miller, editor of the Preservation Law Reporter, Michael F. Zimny of Florida's Bureau of Historic Preservation, and Pam Stoddard of the National Alliance of Preservation Commissions. Finally, the author thanks his family for their invaluable patience and support. Return to text.

[1] U.S. PRESERVATION COMM'N, IDENTIFICATION PROJECT 13 (1994) [hereinafter USPCIP REPORT). Return to text.

[2] See Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So. 2d 170, 179-180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (upholding the designation of Miami's Parrot Jungle against a due process claim). Return to text.

[3] See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (holding that the refusal of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission to approve plans for construction of a 50-story office building over Grand Central Terminal was not a "taking" of private property). Return to text.

[4] Section 12204 of the ADA and Section 4.1.7 of the Accessibility Guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Architectural & Transportation Barriers Compliance Board specifically govern historic properties. See 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (1994); 36 C.F.R. § 1191.2 (1997) (Appendix A). Return to text.

[5] See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in a case arising out of the refusal of a local zoning authority to grant a building permit to a historic church). Return to text.

[6] See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also discussion infra Part II.B. Return to text.

[7] Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting language contained in the local historic preservation ordinance governing the Old San Diego Historic District). Return to text.

[8] Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955) (quoting language contained in the Nantucket, Massachusetts, historic preservation ordinance). Return to text.

[9] 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Return to text.

[10] Id. at 108. Return to text.

[11] See E.L. ROY HUNT ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN FLORIDA ch. 1, at 9 (1988). Return to text.

[12] See 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1994 & Supp. 1997). Return to text.

[13] See HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 5, at 1 ("[L]isting on the National Register only protects property from adverse actions funded, licensed, permitted or otherwise assisted in part or in whole by federal or State of Florida agencies."). Return to text.

[14] Ch. 3060, §§ 1-4, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994)). Return to text.

[15] See 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994). Return to text.

[16] Ch. 593, §§ 1-7, 49 Stat. 666 (1935) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1994)). Return to text.

[17] 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1994). Return to text.

[18] Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1994)). Return to text.

[19] See 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1994 & Supp. 1997). Return to text.

[20] 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1997). Return to text.

[21] See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Return to text.

[22] See id. § 470a(c). This certification program, known as the Certified Local Government Program, is discussed in detail in Part IV.A of this Comment. Return to text.

[23] But see FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(b) (1997) (allowing the state to protect areas "containing, or having a significant impact on, historical or archaeological resources, sites, or statutorily defined historical or archaeological districts"); see also HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 26-29. Return to text.

[24] See Act effective July 1, 1959, ch. 59-521, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 1758 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 266 (1997)); see also HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 4. Return to text.

[25] See Act effective Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 67-50, §§ 1-13, 1967 Fla. Laws 116 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 267 (1997)). Return to text.

[26] See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-163, § 42, 1986 Fla. Laws 794 (amending FLA. STAT. § 267.011 (1986)). Return to text.

[27] FLA. STAT. § 267.061(1)(a) (1997). Return to text.

[28] See HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 31. Return to text.

[29] Act effective July 1, 1985, ch. 85-55, §§ 1-19, 1985 Fla. Laws 207 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1997)). Return to text.

[30] See FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(1)(b) (1997). Return to text.

[31] See id. § 163.3177(9)(c). The GMA requires local governments' comprehensive plans to be consistent with the state plan and its corresponding regional plan. See id. Return to text.

[32] See id. § 267.061(3)(a). Return to text.

[33] See id. § 267.061(3)(h). Florida's Certified Local Government Program is discussed in detail in Part IV.A of this Comment. Return to text.

[34] See U.S. CONST. amend. X. Return to text.

[35] See HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 30. Return to text.

[36] See Kristan E. Curry, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 233-34 (1996). Return to text.

[37] See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[38] See Act effective Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 67-50, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 116 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 267 (1997)) (instituting the Florida Historical Resources Act). This legislation gives the Division of Historical Resources the authority to "adopt such rules as deemed necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." FLA. STAT. § 267.031(1) (1997). Return to text.

[39] The difference between a preservation board created by the state legislature and a locally enacted historic preservation ordinance is that the preservation board is eligible to receive financial benefits under chapter 266, while the local commission is not. However, the local commission has the power to designate landmarks, while the preservation boards can only act under the authority granted to it by the state, which omitted the authority to designate individual historic landmarks. See FLA. STAT. ch. 266 (1997); see also HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 18. Return to text.

[40] 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Return to text.

[41] See id. at 138. Return to text.

[42] See id. at 107 n.1 (citing NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, A GUIDE TO STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS (1976)). Return to text.

[43] See T. BOASBERG ET AL., 1 HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW & TAXATION iii (1986). Return to text.

[44] See id. § 7.01 (Supp. 1989). Return to text.

[45] See NAT'L ALLIANCE OF PRESERVATION COMM'N, U.S. PRESERVATION COMMISSION IDENTIFICATION PROJECT DATABASE (1998) (maintained by the Office of Preservation Servs., School of Envtl. Design, Univ. of Ga.). Return to text.

[46] See id. The cities and counties in Florida with active preservation commissions are Auburndale, Boca Raton, Bradenton, Broward County, Chipley, Clay County, Collier County, Coral Gables, Dade City, Daytona Beach, DeLand, Delray Beach, Eatonville, Eustis, Fort Myers, Gainesville, Gulfport, Hialeah, Hillsborough County, Hollywood, Homestead, Indian River County, Jacksonville, Key West, Lake Worth, Lakeland, Lee County, Marion County, McIntosh, Metro-Dade County, Miami, Miami Beach, Miami Springs, Micanopy, Monroe County, New Smyrna Beach, Newberry, Ocala, Opa-Locka, Orlando, Ormond Beach, Palatka, Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Plant City, Quincy, St. Augustine, St. Petersburg, Sanford, Sarasota, Seminole County, South Miami, Sugar Loaf Key, Tallahassee/Leon County, Tampa, Valparaiso, Volusia County, Washington County, West Palm Beach, and Windermere. Return to text.

[47] Compare U.S. CONST., amend. V ("[N]or [shall any person be] deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."), with FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . ."); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 2, at 31. Return to text.

[48] See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1941) (noting that under an equal protection analysis, a regulation prohibiting "unusually large signs" is appropriate because it is not arbitrary or discriminatory); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 926 (Fla. 1978) (England, C.J., concurring) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine may be an appropriate source of a remedy). Return to text.

[49] 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Return to text.

[50] Id. at 108 (footnote omitted). Return to text.

[51] See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-33 (1978); Citizens to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of Colum. Dept. of Housing & Community Dev., 432 A.2d 710, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975); South of Second Assocs. v. City of Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Colo. 1978); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 368 A.2d 163, 170 (Conn. 1976); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbets, 202 A.2d 232, 235 (N.H. 1964); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 18-19 (N.M. 1964); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 453 (N.C. 1979). Return to text.

[52] See HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 2 at 32 (citing Georgetown, 580 P.2d at 811 ("The ordinance contains sufficient standards to advise ordinary and reasonable men as to the type of construction permitted, permits reasonable application by the Commission, and limits the Commission's discretionary powers.")). Return to text.

[53] Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 (footnote omitted). Return to text.

[54] Esteban v. Central Mo. St. College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969). Return to text.

[55] See Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 612 (D.S.C. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has never imposed a requirement that an ordinance specifying grounds for denial of a permit exhaust the range of possibilities in order to withstand facial challenge."); see also Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Colum. Dep't of Consumer and Reg. Aff., 655 A.2d 865, 873 (D.C. 1995). Return to text.

[56] See discussion infra Part III.E. Return to text.

[57] Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting language contained in the local historic preservation ordinance governing the Old San Diego Historic District). Return to text.

[58] Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232, 235 (N.H. 1964) (quoting language contained in a preservation ordinance governing districts within the Town of Deering). Return to text.

[59] Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955) (quoting language contained in the Nantucket, Massachusetts, historic preservation ordinance). Return to text.

[60] CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 2421-90, art. II, § 6(d)(1)-(2) (1990). Return to text.

[61] See MARY BRANDENBURG & WILLIAM DALE WATERS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, A DESIGN GUIDELINES HANDBOOK, 15-27 (1992). Return to text.

[62] See id. at 63-70. The guidelines regarding roofs are partially delineated below:

ROOFS:

Pediment roofs characterize Neoclassical Revivals. New England gambrel roofs have two steep upper slopes, while Dutch gambrel roofs have two short upper slopes and a lower slope with a bell-like flare. Decorative details often can be found below the roof and under the eaves. . . . Wood shakes and shingles, plated steel, clay tiles, and tar and gravel covered early West Palm Beach buildings. . . . Most historic roofing materials are still available, so roofs can be repaired inconspicuously. Composition materials, such as asphalt and asbestos shingles, and roll roofing are not historic materials. . . . A building's character can be affected significantly by installing equipment such as air conditioners, solar hot water heaters, antennas, or elevator equipment on the roof. If they must be located on a roof, the best place is an inconspicuous one where the equipment is not visible from sidewalks or streets. Changing a roof by adding new features such as dormer windows or skylights, is not acceptable. Original features should be kept, but the addition of new ones decreases a buildings historic value.

Id. at 63-64, 66. Return to text.

[63] See, e.g., Nadelson v. Township of Millburn, 688 A.2d 672, 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). Return to text.

[64] See id. (recognizing the significance of the guidelines even though they were not incorporated by reference into the text of the ordinance). Return to text.

[65] See Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Colum. Dep't of Consumer and Reg. Aff., 655 A.2d 865, 873 (D.C. 1995). Return to text.

[66] See id. Return to text.

[67] 36 C.F.R. § 68.3 (1997). These standards require, in part, that a historic property "be used as it was historically, or be given a new use that maximizes the retention of distinctive materials, features, spaces and spatial relationships," and that "[w]ork needed to stabilize, consolidate and conserve existing historic materials and features will be physically and visually compatible." Id. § 68.3(a)(1), (3). Return to text.

[68] See id. §§ 68.3- .4. Return to text.

[69] See id. § 68.1. Return to text.

[70] 654 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Return to text.

[71] See id. at 176. "The Dade County Historic Preservation Ordinance is patterned on the federal historic preservation regulations . . . which are generally accepted within the field of historic preservation . . . ." Id. at 176-77. Return to text.

[72] Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbets, 202 A.2d 232, 235 (N.H. 1964)). Return to text.

[73] 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979). Return to text.

[74] Id. at 454. Return to text.

[75] See id. Return to text.

[76] See id. (noting that the Victorian architecture was readily identifiable and stating that Raleigh's planning director found the historic district to contain the best examples of the Victorian style in the area). Return to text.

[77] See id. Return to text.

[78] See id. Return to text.

[79] Id. Return to text.

[80] Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). Return to text.

[81] A-S-P Assocs., 258 S.E.2d at 454. Return to text.

[82] See Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (Gersten, J., concurring). Return to text.

[83] See Maher, 516 F.2d at 1062; see also Tippett, 645 So. 2d at 537 (stating that "delegation to a Board of historic preservation experts has been held to be a protection against arbitrary political infringement"); South of Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807, 808-09 n.1 (Colo. 1978) (stating that qualifications of commission members "weighs heavily" against claims of arbitrary enforcement). Return to text.

[84] Most local historic preservation ordinances govern many individual historic properties and historic districts, each located in a different environment and historically significant for different reasons. Thus, a commission with a broad array of experts will be more effective in dealing with different problems that may arise than a commission comprised of experts in a single field. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. Return to text.

[85] See U-Haul Co. of Eastern Mo., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 855 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Return to text.

[86] A.S.P. Assoc., 258 S.E.2d at 454. Return to text.

[87] See HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, at ch. 2, 35. Return to text.

[88] See Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas County Comm. College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. 1977). Return to text.

[89] See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted) ("The elaborate decision-making and appeal process set forth in the ordinance creates another structural check on any potential for arbitrariness that might exist."). Return to text.

[90] See Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). Return to text.

[91] See Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding that the right to appeal was "frequently relied upon as a basis for holding that standards and criteria are adequate" where the ordinance provided for an appeal to the city commission and then to the circuit court). Return to text.

[92] See, e.g., A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 455 (N.C. 1979) (citation omitted). Return to text.

[93] Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 611 (D.S.C. 1995). Return to text.

[94] See id.; see also Nadelson v. Township of Millburn, 688 A.2d 672, 678-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). Return to text.

[95] LCP, Inc. v. District of Colum. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 499 A.2d 897, 902 (D.C. App. 1985). Return to text.

[96] Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Colum. Dep't of Consumer and Reg. Affs., 655 A.2d 865, 873 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the term "special merit" in a historic preservation ordinance). Return to text.

[97] See id. at 902 n.3 (noting that a regulatory board can proceed "either by regulation or case-by-case adjudication"). Return to text.

[98] See Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So. 2d 170, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Return to text.

[99] See id. Return to text.

[100] Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975). Return to text.

[101] See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); see also Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. 1979) (noting that "the complex and ever-changing conditions that attend and affect . . . [regulation under the police power] make it impracticable for the Legislature to prescribe all necessary rules and regulations") (quoting Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 350, 82 So. 789, 793 (1919)). Return to text.

[102] 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964). Return to text.

[103] Id. at 19. Return to text.

[104] Id. at 18. Return to text.

[105] See Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So. 2d 170, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quoting Gulf Coast Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 462 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 1985)). Return to text.

[106] See Mayes v. City of Dallas, 747 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1984) ("harmonize with the structure's facade;" "complement the overall character of the District;" "architecturally and historically appropriate;" and "compatible and harmonize with the existing structures in the block"); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 n.58, 59 (5th Cir. 1975) ("quaint and distinctive character" and "architectural and historical value"); Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 612 (D.S.C. 1995) ("intense or lurid colors, a multiplicity or incongruity of details resulting in a restless and disturbing appearance, and an absence of unity and coherence not in consonance with the character of the existing structure"); Second Baptist Church v. Little Rock Hist. Dist. Comm'n, 732 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Ark. 1987) ("obviously incongruous with the historic aspects of the District") (emphasis omitted); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 424-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) ("in general accord with the appearance of the structures built in Old San Diego prior to 1871;" "designs prevailing during the principal recognized Old San Diego Historical periods;" and "conform in appearance, size, position and design to the quaint and distinctive character of Old San Diego District, and . . . not injuriously affect the same"); South of Second Assocs. v. City of Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807, 810 (Colo. 1978) ("the effect of the proposed [change] upon the 'general historical and/or architectural character of the structure or area' . . . [and] the architectural style, arrangement, texture, and material used on existing buildings or structures . . . and their relationship to other structures in the area"); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 368 A.2d 163, 170 n.3 (Conn. 1976) ("A certificate of appropriateness may be refused . . . [if] in the opinion of the commission, [it] would be detrimental to the interest of the historic district."); Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of Colum. Dept. of Housing and Comm. Dev., 432 A.2d 710, 719 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) ("exemplary architecture"); Life Concepts, Inc. v. Harden, 562 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ("compatible with the surrounding residential uses"); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955) ("obviously incongruous to the historic aspects of the surroundings"); U-Haul Co. of Eastern Mo., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 855 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("generally compatible with the style and design of surrounding improvements and conducive to the proper architectural development of the community"); Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("degenerated beyond feasible limits for rehabilitation" and "rehabilitation impractical"); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232, 234-36 (N.H. 1964) ("impair the atmosphere of the Town;" "relationship . . . to its surroundings;" "compatibility of land uses;" and "character and integrity of [the] district"); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 19 (N.M. 1964) ("harmony with adjacent buildings, preservation of historical and characteristic qualities, and conformity to the Old Santa Fe Style"); Salvatore v. City of Schenectady, 530 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("compatibility . . . with existing structures of historic or architectural value . . . and with the environment of open spaces in the surrounding neighborhood"); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 452 (N.C. 1979) ("incongruous with the historic aspects of the district") (emphasis omitted); Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ohio 1984) ("accepted and recognized architectural principles"); Park Home v. City of Williamsport, 680 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. 1996) ("[t]he effect of the proposed change upon the general historic and architectural nature of the district" and "[t]he appropriateness of exterior architectural features"); Bellevue Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. Chase, 574 A.2d 760, 763 (R.I. 1990) ("historic or architectural value or significance of the structure and its relation to the historic value of the surrounding area" and "general compatibility of exterior design, arrangement, texture and material"); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Wis. 1955) ("architectural appeal" and "substantial depreciation in the property values of [the] neighborhood") (emphasis omitted). Return to text.

[107] Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Return to text.

[108] 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(7)(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997). Return to text.

[109] See id. Return to text.

[110] See generally 36 C.F.R. Part 61 (1997) (containing federal procedures for certified local government programs). Return to text.

[111] See id. Return to text.

[112] These include Auburndale, Collier County, Coral Gables, DeLand, Delray Beach, Eatonville, Eustis, Fort Myers, Gainesville, Gulfport, Hillsborough County, Hollywood, Homestead, Jacksonville, Key West, Lake Worth, Lakeland, Lee County, Metro-Dade County, Miami, Micanopy, New Smyrna Beach, Ocala, Orlando, Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Plant City, St. Augustine, St. Petersburg, Sanford, Sarasota, Tallahassee/Leon County, Tampa, West Palm Beach, and Windermere. See Listing obtained from the Florida Department of State, Division of Historical Resources, Bureau of Historic Preservation (December 1997) (on file with the Bureau of Historic Preservation, Tallahassee, Florida). Return to text.

[113] See 36 C.F.R. § 61.5(c) (1997). Return to text.

[114] See id. Return to text.

[115] Id. § 61.5(c)(1) (emphasis added). Return to text.

[116] See id. Return to text.

[117] See id. § 61.5(c)(2) (discussing appointing experts in areas such as "architecture, history, architectural history, planning, archeology, or other historic preservation related disciplines, such as urban planning"). Return to text.

[118] See id. Return to text.

[119] See id. § 61.5(c)(2)(i). Return to text.

[120] See id. § 61.5(c)(3). Return to text.

[121] See id. § 61.5(c)(4). Return to text.

[122] See BUREAU OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ST., FLORIDA CERTIFIED LOCAL GOVERNMENT GUIDELINES Part B (1993) (incorporated by reference in 1 FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 1A-38.007 (1997)) [hereinafter LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES]. Return to text.

[123] See id. Part B.1. The federal regulations do not require the adoption of a local ordinance if the local government is required to enforce state laws for designating and protecting historic properties. See 36 C.F.R. § 61.5(c)(1) (1997). Florida does not have a statewide law for the designation and protection of historic resources. Thus, to qualify as a CLG, local governments must adopt their own historic preservation ordinances. See generally, HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1, at 5 (providing an overview of the Florida historic preservation scheme). Return to text.

[124] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.a. Return to text.

[125] See id. Part B.1.b; see also discussion supra Part II.A.1. Return to text.

[126] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.b. Return to text.

[127] See id. Part B.1.c. Return to text.

[128] See id. Part B.1.d. Return to text.

[129] See id. Part B.1.e. Return to text.

[130] See id. Return to text.

[131] See id. Part B.1.g. Return to text.

[132] See id. Part B.2. Return to text.

[133] See id. Part B.2.c. Return to text.

[134] In addition to the requirements contained in the actual text of a CLG ordinance, other factors guard against vagueness claims. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.D, and III.E. Return to text.

[135] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.d. Return to text.

[136] See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So. 2d 170, 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Return to text.

[137] CITY OF DELAND, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 33-34.03(B)(i) (1995). Return to text.

[138] Id. § 33-34.03(B)(j). Return to text.

[139] LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.3.b. Return to text.

[140] See id. Part B.3.d. Return to text.

[141] Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1975). Return to text.

[142] Id. Return to text.

[143] See discussion supra Part III.B. Return to text.

[144] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.2.c. Return to text.

[145] See discussion supra Part III.C.1. Return to text.

[146] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.e. Return to text.

[147] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[148] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.e (stating only that a "right of and mechanism for appeal must exist in the legislation"). Return to text.

[149] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[150] See supra note 46. Return to text.

[151] These include Boca Raton, Bradenton, Broward County, Chipley, Clay County, Dade City, Daytona Beach, Hialeah, Indian River County, Marion County, McIntosh, Miami Beach, Miami Springs, Monroe County, Newberry, Opa-Locka, Ormond Beach, Palatka, Quincy, Seminole County, South Miami, Sugar Loaf Key, Valparaiso, Volusia County, and Washington County. Return to text.

[152] See discussion supra Part III.A. Return to text.

[153] See CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 86-51, art. 5.5 (1986). The Daytona Beach ordinance requires that individual designations "prescribe . . . the types of construction, alteration, demolition and removal that should be reviewed for appropriateness; [and] the design guidelines for applying the criteria for review of appropriateness." Id. art. 4.7. Return to text.

[154] See CHIPLEY, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 645 (1985). Return to text.

[155] See CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11 (1992). Return to text.

[156] See CHIPLEY, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 645, § 29-142(3)(g) (1985). Return to text.

[157] Id. § 29-142(6)(l)(a)(iv). Return to text.

[158] See CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11, § 11.11.4 (1992). The guidelines state, in part, that the Board shall determine "the effect of the proposed work on the landmark or the property upon which such work is to be done [and] the relationship between such work and other structures on the landmark site or other property in the historic district." Id. Return to text.

[159] The importance of referencing the Secretary's Standards is discussed in Part III.A of this comment. Return to text.

[160] See discussion supra Part III.B. Return to text.

[161] CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 86-51, art. 4.2 (1986). Return to text.

[162] Id. Return to text.

[163] See CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11, § 3.3.3 (1992). Return to text.

[164] See CHIPLEY, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 645, § 29-142(3) (1985) (listing the duties and responsibilities of the Landmark Commission). Return to text.

[165] See discussion supra Part III.C. Return to text.

[166] See CHIPLEY, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 645, § 29-142(4) (1985); CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 86-51, art. 3.2 (1986); CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11, § 3.3.1 (1992). Return to text.

[167] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[168] See CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 86-51, art. 5.7 (1986); CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11, § 11.11.2 (1992). Return to text.

[169] See discussion supra Part III.C.3. Return to text.

[170] See CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 86-51, art. 5.2 (1986) (stating that "any applicant may request a meeting with the Preservation Board during the review period"). Return to text.

[171] See CITY OF NEWBERRY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art. 11, § 3.3.2 (1992) (listing procedures to be followed by the Historic Architectural Review Board); CHIPLEY, FLA., ORDINANCE No. 645, § 29-142(4) (1985) (noting that "[n]o business shall be conducted by the Commission without the presence of a majority of voting members"). Return to text.

[172] See discussion supra Part IV.A. Return to text.

[173] In evaluating whether or not to implement the changes recommended in this section, the Florida Bureau of Historic Preservation must weigh the projected benefit of such changes against the projected cost to local commissions. Such a cost/benefit analysis is outside the scope of this Comment. Return to text.

[174] See USPCIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. Return to text.

[175] See id. Return to text.

[176] See Nadelson v. Township of Millburn, 688 A.2d 672, 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). Return to text.

[177] 36 C.F.R. § 68.3(a)(3) (1997). Return to text.

[178] Id. § 68.3(a)(2). Return to text.

[179] For example, the criteria and guidelines promulgated by the West Palm Beach Historic Preservation Commission provide detailed descriptions of properties and districts designated as historic and describe the significance of architectural features such as roofs, porches, and chimneys. See BRANDENBURG & WATERS, supra note 61, at 15-27. Return to text.

[180] As previously noted, overly specific guidelines limit the flexibility, and thus the effectiveness, of the commissions. See discussion supra Part III.E. However, by locating the specific guidelines outside the text of the ordinance, they can be amended more easily than when they are in the actual text of the ordinance itself. In any event, an implementing commission should promulgate guidelines that strike the proper balance between specificity and flexibility. Return to text.

[181] See discussion supra Part III.C.3. Return to text.

[182] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[183] See LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B.1.e. Return to text.

[184] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[185] See discussion supra Part II.A.2. Return to text.

[186] See generally LOCAL GOV'T GUIDELINES, supra note 122, Part B (stating that acceptance into the CLG program is gained through the Bureau of Historic Preservation). Return to text.

[187] See discussion supra Part IV.A. Return to text.

[188] See discussion supra Part III.A. Return to text.

[189] See discussion supra Part III.C.1. Return to text.

[190] See discussion supra Part III.C.2. Return to text.

[191] As discussed in the introduction to this Comment, local historic preservation ordinances should be concerned with the protection of historic resources and withstanding legal challenges. Local commissions face legal challenges based not only on the vagueness doctrine, but also on procedural due process, private property rights, the ADA, and the designation of religious properties. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. Return to text.